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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida. Although the article is focused primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1994, and June 30, 1995, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period which are either of
particular interest to the appellate practitioner or which provide the
background for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases
decided during that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those substan-
tive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this article will
focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and will deal
with substantive areas only with regard to appellate considerations unique
to those areas. Additionally, this article will not discuss cases relating to the
preservation of issues, nor the question of whether particular errors were
harmless.
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted three amendments to the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Two of those amendments will be discussed
in this section of this article, while the third will be discussed in section In
(B), infra.'
A. Rule 9.600: Jurisdiction of Lower Tribunal Pending Review
The court amended rule 9.600(c) to provide that when an appeal is
taken in a dissolution of marriage action, the lower tribunal shall retain
jurisdiction to enter and enforce orders awarding "temporary attorneys'fees
and costs reasonably necessary to prosecute or defend an appeal."'2 The
1994 Committee Note indicates that the rule was amended "to conform to
and implement section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.), authorizing
the lower tribunal to award temporary appellate attorneys' fees, suit money,
1. The amendment not discussed here arose from the fact that the First District Court
of Appeal has split into two autonomous divisions of court. That split is discussed in section
III (A) of this article. Discussion of the amendment, which currently impacts only on the
First District, has thus been deferred until after discussion of the split.
2. Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.140 and 9.600, 657 So. 2d
897, 898 (Fla. 1995).
Vol. 20
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and costs."'3 The amendment also makes some changes in the wording of
the rule with regard to attorney's fees and costs for services rendered in the
lower tribunal, but it continues to allow the lower tribunal to retain
jurisdiction to enter and enforce orders relating to such matters, as well as
"orders awarding separate maintenance, child support, alimony... or other
awards necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending
appeal."4
B. Rule 9.800: Uniform Citation System
Rule 9.800(n) was amended to include a sentence that states: "When
referring to specific material within a Florida court's opinion, pinpoint
citation to the page of the Southern Reporter where that material occurs is
optional, although preferred. 5 This amendment is the result of problems
that have arisen from the increasing use of electronic databases that do not
utilize the page numbering system employed by the West Publishing
Company in the Southern Reporter.
6
III. COURT DIVISIONS
A. The First District
In In re Court Divisions,7 the First District Court of Appeal' became
the first Florida district court to create two autonomous divisions of court.
The Administrative Division, to which five judges were initially assigned,9
will consider administrative appeals arising under specifically enumerated
provisions of the Florida Statutes,10 and original proceedings arising out
3. lad at 898 app. A (citing the 1994 committee note to FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.600).
4. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.600(c).
5. In re Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.800(n), 20 Fla. L. Weekly S524 (October
12, 1995).
6. It is interesting to note that the amendment refers only to "material within a Florida
court's opinion." IM Presumably, the use of such limiting language means that the rule does
require specific page citations to West, or other official, reporters when references are made
to material within opinions of courts from other jurisdictions.
7. 648 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
8. Florida's district courts of appeal will hereinafter be referred to as the First District,
the Second District, the Third District, the Fourth District and the Fifth District.
9. In re Assignment of Judges to Divisions, 648 So. 2d 764, 764 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
10. The specific provisions are set forth in Court Divisions, 648 So. 2d at 761-62.
1995]
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of or involving proceedings under those provisions." The General
Division, to which the court's other ten judges were assigned,' 2 will
consider all matters not assigned to the Administrative Division. 3
B. En Banc Determination
Subsequent to the division of the First District, the supreme court
amended Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331 by creating a new
subparagraph (b). 4  The new provision states that if a district court
chooses to sit in subject matter divisions, "en banc determinations shall be
limited to those regular active judges within the division to which the case
is assigned, unless the chief judge determines that the case involves matters
of general application and that en banc determination should be made by all
regular active judges."15 It goes on to provide that "in the absence of such
a determination by the chief judge, the full court may determine by an
affirmative vote of three-fifths of the active judges that the case involves
matters that should be heard and decided by the full court ....""
The supreme court adopted this rule amendment by a 4-3 vote.' 7 In
a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Shaw and Kogan concurred, Justice
Anstead pointed out that three judges in a five-judge division of a fifteen-
judge court 8 will have the authority to control an en banc decision.' 9
Justice Anstead further stated that since three judges will be able to overturn
a prior decision, and since the chances of overturning a decision will be
increased as judges regularly rotate into and out of the five-judge division,
"the consistency and stability provided by the required participation of the
entire court will be lost. 20
Justice Overton, in a specially concurring opinion with which Chief
Justice Grimes concurred, responded to the dissenters' concerns. He stated,
11. Id. at 762.
12. Assignment of Judges, 648 So. 2d at 764.
13. Court Divisions, 648 So. 2d at 761.
14. In re Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(b), 646 So. 2d 730
(Fla. 1994).
15. Id. at 731.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 730.
18. Although not specifically noted by Justice Anstead, the numbers to which he refers
reflect the size of the First District as a whole and of its Administrative Division.
Assignment of Judges, 648 So. 2d at 764.
19. Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(b), 646 So. 2d at 731
(Anstead, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
Vol. 20
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"I disagree with the anticipated horribles of the dissent. We need to allow
new ideas an opportunity to be tested to see if they will work in a way that
will improve efficiency and consistency in the appellate decision-making
process."2'
C. Appellate Division of the Circuit Court
In Melkonian v. Goldman,22 the petitioner sought certiorari review, in
the Circuit Court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, of an administra-
tive decision to suspend his driver's license.' An individual judge denied
the petition, concluding that it failed to demonstrate a prima facie case.24
The Third District granted certiorari and quashed the order, finding that the
failure to assign the case to a three-judge panel, and the delegation instead
to an individual judge, of the task of deciding the petition on its merits,
constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law.25
The Third District pointed out that the supreme court promulgated a
local rule for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit that establishes an Appellate
Division of that court.26 That rule provides that certiorari petitions are to
be heard on their merits by three-judge panels of the Appellate Division.27
Through a memorandum, however, the administrative judge of the Appellate
Division implemented a procedure by which individual judges rule on the
motions.28 The memorandum provided for petitions for writs of certiorari
to be assigned to an individual judge for determination of "'whether a Prima
Facie case has been raised requiring a panel's review."'' 29
The Third District found the portion of the administrative order that
allowed an individual judge to rule on the merits of a petition for writ of
certiorari to be inconsistent with the local rule and therefore void.30 The
court relied on Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.020(c), which
indicates that administrative orders must not be inconsistent with "'court
rules and administrative orders entered by the supreme court.'" 3 The court
21. Id. at 730 (Overton, J., concurring specially).
22. 647 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
23. Id. at 1009.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Melkonian, 647 So. 2d at 1009.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1009-10.
31. Id. at 1009 (emphasis omitted).
1995]
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did indicate, however, that its opinion should not be read to invalidate the
remaining portions of the administrative order.32
IV. JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction on Discretionary Review
In both Gee v. Seidman & Seidman33 and Salgat v. State,34 the
supreme court declined to reach the merits of the case because the district
courts certified to be of great public importance questions upon which they
did not first pass.35 The court noted in Gee that under article V, section
3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, the court only "has jurisdiction to review
'any decision of a district court on appeal that passes upon a question
certified by it to be of great public importance.'
' 36
B. Jurisdiction When a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Is Filed
In State v. Schopp,37 the supreme court addressed a respondent's claim
that the court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent had filed a notice
of voluntary dismissal in the district court prior to the final disposition of
his appeal.38 After the district court's decision was issued, the respondent,
Schopp, who was the appellant in the district court, timely filed a motion for
rehearing. 39 Before the district court ruled on that motion, the State, the
appellee in the district court, timely sought review in the supreme court.4°
While the motion for rehearing was still pending, Schopp filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.350(b).4'
The State moved to strike the notice.42 Schopp then sought a writ of
mandamus from the supreme court to compel the district court to dismiss the
appeal. The district court granted the motion to strike and denied the
32. Melkonian, 647 So. 2d at 1010 n.2.
33. 653 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1995).
34. 652 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1995).
35. Gee, 653 So. 2d at 385; Salgat, 652 So. 2d at 815.
36. Gee, 653 So. 2d at 385 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4)).
37. 653 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1995).
38. Id. at 1018.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1018.
Vol. 20
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motion for rehearing 3 Schopp then moved to dismiss the supreme court
proceeding, alleging that he had a right to have the district court proceeding
dismissed and that the supreme court therefore lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.4
The supreme court rejected Schopp's claim, stating that "[e]ven where
a notice of voluntary dismissal is timely filed, a reviewing court has
discretion to retain jurisdiction and proceed with the appeal."45 The court
noted that it is particularly true that the court retains such discretion when,
as in the case under review, a case presents a question of public impor-
tance46 and when substantial judicial labor has been expended, as evi-
denced by the issuance of an initial opinion.47
C. Jurisdiction of a District Court When Discretionary Review
Has Been Sought
In Portu v. State,4" nine days after the issuance of an opinion, the
State filed a notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the supreme
court.49  Six days thereafter, the defendant filed a timely motion for
clarification of the opinion in the district court." - In response to the
motion, the State argued that its notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction
stripped the district court of the power to act on the defendant's motion.51
The court granted the defendant's motion for clarification,52 and the State
then filed a motion to reinstate the original opinion, continuing to assert that
the court lacked jurisdiction.53
The Third District disagreed, concluding that its jurisdiction to rule on
timely filed motion does not expire until it renders an order disposing of
such motions.54 The court noted that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.020(g)(1) states that when a motion for rehearing or clarification of an
43. Id
44. Ua
45. d
46. The district court had certified the existence of a question of great public
importance. Id. at 1018 n.1.
47. Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1018.
48. 654 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
49. IM. at 169.
50. Md
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Portu, 654 So. 2d at 169.
54. Id
1995]
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order has been filed, the order is not deemed rendered "'until the filing of
a signed, written order disposing of all such motions between such
parties. '''5 The court went on to find that since rule 9.120(b) provides that
the discretionary jurisdiction of the supreme court is invoked by the filing
of a notice within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, 6 the
State's time for filing a notice did not even begin until the court rendered
a written order disposing of the defendant's motion for clarification.
Accordingly, the court found the State's notice to be premature, and denied
the motion to reinstate. 8
V. ORDERS REVIEWABLE
A. Appeals from Denials of Summary Judgment Motions Based
on Claims of Qualified Immunity
Although the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide for
appeals from orders denying motions for summary judgment, the supreme
court, in Tucker v. Resha,59 concluded that when a public official asserts
qualified immunity in response to a federal civil rights claim in a Florida
court, an order denying such a motion is subject to interlocutory review to
the extent that the order turns on an issue of law. 60 The court's conclusion
was based primarily on the reasoning of Mitchell v. Forsyth.6' In that case,
the Supreme Court of the United States stated that the qualified immunity
of public officials involves immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability; that this is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial; and that an order denying qualified immunity is effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment, as the public official cannot
be "re-immunized" if erroneously required to stand trial or face other
burdens of litigation.62
In its opinion, the Tucker court specifically noted that Florida's
appellate rules do not provide for interlocutory review of orders of the sort
addressed by the case.63 The court therefore requested the Florida Bar
55. Id. (quoting FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(g)(1)).
56. Id. at 170.
57. Id. at 169.
58. Portu, 654 So. 2d at 170.
59. 648 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1994).
60. ld at 1190.
61. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
62. Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1189 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27).
63. Id. at 1189.
Vol. 20
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/2
Musto
Appellate Court Rules Committee to submit a proposed amendment that will
address the rule change mandated by this decision.'
4
Subsequently, the First District, in Department of Education v. Roe,65
concluded that it would not extend Tucker beyond its specific facts, and thus
declined to review a denial of a motion to dismiss that asserted a claim of
sovereign immunity regarding a cause of action under state law.
66
B. Certiorari Review of Orders Permitting Plaintiffs to Amend
Complaints to Include Claims for Punitive Damages
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. King,67 the supreme court resolved a
conflict among the districts regarding the question of whether it is appropri-
ate for an appellate court to review by certiorari an order of a trial court
permitting a plaintiff to amend a complaint to include a punitive damages
claim under section 768.72 of the Florida Statutes.68
The statute provides that "no claim for punitive damages shall be
permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or
proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for
recovery of such damages. '69  The statute goes on to state that "[n]o
discovery of financial worth shall proceed until after the pleading concerning
punitive damages is permitted."
70
The court indicated that it read the statute to "create a substantive legal
right not to be subject to a punitive damages claim and ensuing financial
worth discovery until the trial court makes a determination that there is a
reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery of punitive damages. 71
The court then noted that the Fourth District, in Kraft General Foods,
Inc. v. Rosenblum,72 Henn v. Sadler,73 and Sports Products, Inc. v. Estate
of Inalien,74 ruled that the procedure established by the statute must be
followed, and that the failure to adhere to that procedure is a departure from
64. Id. at 1190.
65. 656 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
66. Id, at 507.
67. 658 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1995).
68. I& at 519.
69. FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1993).
70. Id.
71. Globe Newspaper, 658 So. 2d at 519.
72. 635 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 642 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.
1994).
73. 589 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1991) (en banc).
74. 658 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1995]
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the essential requirements of law. The court expressed its agreement with
the Fourth District and held "that appellate courts should grant certiorari in
instances in which there is a demonstration by a petitioner that the
procedures of section 768.72 have not been followed."75
The court declined the petitioner's invitation "to take a further step..
and hold that certiorari may also be granted to review the sufficiency of
the evidence considered by a trial judge in a section 768.72 determina-
tion. 76  The court thus disapproved of the Third District's decision in
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Rockhead,77 which had taken such an
approach.78 The court summed up its holding by stating:
We specifically agree with the reasoning of the Fourth District in its
decision in Sports Products, Inc., that certiorari review is appropriate to
determine whether a court has conducted the evidentiary inquiry
required by section 768.72, Florida Statutes, but not so broad as to
encompass review of the sufficiency of the evidence considered in that
inquiry.79
C. Issues Certified to the Supreme Court
In Canal Insurance Co. v. Reed,8" the First District held that review
is not available, either by appeal or certiorari, of an order deciding an
insurance coverage issue in a third party declaratory judgment action
between an insurer and its insured, prior to a final determination of liability
in the underlying action, that results in the insurer having to provide liability
coverage for the insured in the underlying action.8 The court certified to
the supreme court, however, as a question of great public importance, the
issue of whether, under such circumstances, the insurer may seek immediate
review of the order and, if so, whether such review should be by certiorari,
appeal of a non-final order, or appeal of a final order.82
75. Globe Newspaper, 658 So. 2d at 520.
76. Id.
77. 639 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
78. In a humorous aside to the legal issues involved, Chief Judge Schwartz, the author
of the majority opinion in Commercial Carrier, noting the fact that both the petitioner and
the respondent were represented by attorneys with the last name of "Schwartz," stated, "[like
a pride of lions, and an exaltation of larks, this case involves an intelligence of (unrelated)
Schwartzes." Id. at 661 n.*.
79. Globe Newspaper, 658 So. 2d at 520.
80. 653 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
81. Id. at 1090.
82. Id. at 1090-91.
Vol. 20
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In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Century Construction Corp.,"3 the First
District found that a non-final order denying motions to dismiss a third-party
complaint, which was entered after the entry of judgment in the main action
was not appealable.84 The court certified conflict with the decision in
Mogul v. Fodiman,85 which concluded that Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130(a)(4), which allows for appeals from non-final orders
entered after a final order, appear "'broad enough to permit an appeal from'
an order denying a motion seeking a protective order to prevent certain
discovery in a supplementary proceeding."86 The First District reasoned
that "the rule was intended to apply only to orders entered after a final order
which would otherwise be unreviewable."87 The court stated: "To hold
that the order sought to be appealed here is immediately reviewable pursuant
to rule 9.130(a)(4) would lead inevitably to the result that all interlocutory
orders entered in third-party actions following the entry of judgment in the
main action would, likewise, be immediately reviewable."88 The court
pointed out that since such a conclusion would result in an enormous waste
of scarce judicial resources, it must presume that the drafters of the rule
intended no such consequence. 9
D. Other Cases
As usual, the appellate courts decided a large number of cases dealing
with the question of whether particular orders were subject to review. A
sampling of those cases includes:
Hernando County v. Leisure Hills, Inc.90 A partial final judgment
determining that the appellee was entitled to have a plat recorded was not
appealable because the trial court had reserved jurisdiction to specifically
order the clerk of court at some future time to record, the plat and to
determine whether damages were appropriate and, if so, the amount of
damages.91
83. 656 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
84. Id at 612.
85. 406 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
86. Maryland Casualty, 656 So. 2d at 612 (quoting Mogul, 406 So. 2d at 1226).
87. Id
88. Id
89. Id
90. 648 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
91. Id at 258.
1995]
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Cohen, Scherer & Cohen, P.A. v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co.92
Found to be nonappealable was an order dismissing a counterclaim with
prejudice, but leaving the main claim pending.93 The court relied on the
fact that the main claim and the counterclaim both arose out of a malprac-
tice claim and the obligations of the parties under the insurance policy in
regard to the malpractice claim.94
Arthur v. Gibson.95 Certiorari was deemed an appropriate method to
review a non-final order denying a motion to disqualify counsel.96
Waller v. Waller.9 7 Not appealable was an order granting a motion
to amend a complaint to add a defendant who had previously obtained a
dismissal based on an allegation that the defendant had not been served with
the initial complaint within the time required by the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.8
Polo v. Polo.99 A non-final order denying a motion to dismiss based
on a claim that the initial process and pleading were not served within the
time required by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was nonappeal-
able.' °
Gregg v. State.'° The court stated that it had no jurisdiction to
review an oral order."°
Valenzuela v. Valenzuela. °3 A non-final order directing a party to
pay an expert witness fee prior to taking the expert's deposition was found
not to be subject to review, either by appeal or by certiorari. 4
Ramseyer v. Williamson.'°5 A trial court's order denying a motion
to dissolve a writ of garnishment was not appealable.'0 6
92. 654 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
93. Id. at 283.
94. Id.
95. 654 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
96. Id. at 984.
97. 650 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
98. Id. at 194.
99. 643 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
100. Id. at 56.
101. 643 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
102. Id. at 107.
103. 648 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
104. Id. at 741.
105. 639 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
106. Id. at 206.
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City of Dania v. Broward County."°  Orders denying motions to
intervene in eminent domain proceedings were held to be appealable, final
orders.'0 8
Stufflebean v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co."° An order granting a
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, and holding that under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a jury verdict in another case was
determinative of the negligence and comparative negligence of the parties,
was held not to be appealable by the plaintiff.110 The plaintiff argued that
the order was appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), which allows for review of orders that determine the
issue of liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief. The court
relied on the fact that the jury verdict had found the plaintiff sixty-five
percent at fault in causing the accident and the fact that the plaintiff had
opposed the application of collateral estoppel. Under these circumstances,
the court found that the order was not one in favor of the plaintiff, who was
the only party seeking affirmative relief, and thus was not appealable.'
Ownby v. Ownby."2 The court reviewed by certiorari an order in a
dissolution of marriage action requiring the husband to comply with a
stipulation in which he agreed to submit to a blood test to determine
paternity.'
Bierman v. Miller."4 Certiorari was employed to review an order
vacating a stay in a legal malpractice action." 5
Robert v. W.R. Grace & Co.16 The court concluded that the denial
of a request to perpetuate testimony by a terminally ill person is a matter
which may be entertained by petition for writ of certiorari. 7
107. 658 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
108. Id. at 164.
109. 645 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1994).
110. Id. at 137.
111. Id.
112. 639 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1994).
113. Id. at 136.
114. 639 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
115. Id. at 627.
116. 639 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. Id. at 1057.
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Oenbrink, D.O. v. Schiegner."' The court recognized that certiorari
review may be used to challenge an order that denies a motion to dismiss
for failure to comply with the statutory presuit notice requirements.' 19
Hickey v. Pompano K of C, Inc. 2' Certiorari was deemed appropri-
ate to review an order severing a plaintiff's trial against one defendant from
her trial against a codefendant.
12 1
Medero v. Florida Power & Light Co." The court reviewed by
certiorari an order denying the plaintiff's motion to compel the deposition
of an executive employed by the defendant."2
Pevsner v. Frederick.124 A non-party witness was found to have the
right to certiorari review of an order imposing sanctions against him for
discovery violations.2"
Becker & Poliakoff v. King. 26  Certiorari was deemed the proper
method of reviewing an order denying a law firm's motion to withdraw as
counsel. 27
Randall v. Guenther.128  A non-final discovery order compelling a
party to testify after she invoked her privilege against self-incrimination was
a proper subject of certiorari review. 29
VI. RENDITION
A. Rubber-Stamped Form Orders
The Second District dealt with a series of cases130 that concerned the
issue of whether orders were rendered when trial judges ruled on them by
using a form order rubber stamp on motions, filling in blanks to indicate the
118. 645 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 131 (Fla.
1995).
119. Id. at 167.
120. 647 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
121. Id. at 271.
122. 658 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
123. Id. at 567.
124. 656 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
125. Id. at 263.
126. 642 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
127. Id. at 822.
128. 650 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
129. Id. at 1072-73.
130. Parnell v. State, 642 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gibson v. State,
642 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Davenport v. State, 640 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Sullivan, 640 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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date and whether the motions were granted or denied and signing beneath
the stamp.131 The court indicated that while it did "not discourage the use
of a short form order stamped on the face of a motion[,] ... such an order
should not be used when it is essential to fix a point from which crucial
time periods are to be calculated for purposes of rendition.'13  The court's
primary problem with the use of such orders was the fact that there was no
indication that the orders were ever filed with the clerk of the circuit
court,133 a requirement for rendition, as that term is defined by Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g).' 34 In light of the fact that a trial
court's order "is not appealable until it is rendered,"' 35 the Second District
dismissed each of the appeals as premature and remanded the matters with
directions to the trial courts to render appropriate orders. 36
In Parnell, however, the court may have given an indication as to how
such form orders could be used in a manner that would result in rendition.
In finding that there was no indication that the order there was filed, the
court stated: "When the document does not receive a second date stamp
from the clerk, 'there is nothing on the face of the appellate record to
establish that the order has ever been rendered.' 37 This language would
seem to imply that rendition would occur if, after a trial court enters a
rubber-stamped order, the clerk would place a date stamp on the motion
indicating that the motion was refiled after the order was entered.
B. Court Status Forms
In State v. Tremblay,3 ' the Fourth District addressed a contention that
an order was rendered when the trial court signed and filed a court status
form reflecting that a charge was dismissed.1 39 The court denied a motion
131. The use of such stamps was apparently widespread by the judges of one particular
circuit, since the four appeals cited in the preceding footnote were from orders entered by
four different judges in the same circuit.
132. Sullivan, 640 So. 2d at 78.
133. Parnell, 642 So. 2d at 1093; Gibson, 642 So. 2d at 44; Davenport, 640 So. 2d at
1225; Sullivan, 640 So. 2d at 78.
134. In pertinent part, rule 9.020(g) provides that "[a]n order is rendered when a signed,
written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal." FLA. R. App. P. 9.020(g).
135. Sullivan, 640 So. 2d at 78 (quoting Billie v. State, 473 So. 2d 34, 34 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985)).
136. Parnell, 642 So. 2d at 1093; Gibson, 642 So. 2d at'44; Davenport, 640 So. 2d at
1225-26; Sullivan, 640 So. 2d at 78.
137. Parnell, 642 So. 2d at 1093.
138. 642 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
139. Id. at 65.
1995]
17
Musto: Appellate Practice
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
to dismiss that was based on this contention, finding no authority to the
effect that a status form constituted a final, appealable order." The court
went on to warn, however, that "although that day has not arrived, we can
envision an occasion when a peculiar set of circumstances might lead us to
conclude that a court status form might be found appealable."'' Thus, the
court felt "compelled to comment that it would behoove the bench and bar
to take precautionary measures in this regard,"' 42 such as "for the trial
judge to make it clear on the record that a subsequent written order will be
prepared, and that any sheet of paper the judge signs which records a
particular ruling as a docket entry, is not intended to be the order subject to
be appealed."' 14
3
VII. VENUE
In Vasilinda v. Lozano, 44 the supreme court adopted the following
principles to be applied to determine in which court appellate jurisdiction
lies when the trial court has granted a change of venue to a circuit located
within another district:
(1) Changes of venue in criminal cases do not become effective
until the court file has been received in the transferee court. Changes
of venue in civil cases do not become effective until the court file has
been received in the transferee court and costs and service charges
required by section 47.191, Florida Statutes (1991), and Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.060 which are applicable to the case are paid.
(2) Appellate jurisdiction is determined at the time the notice of
appeal or petition for extraordinary writ is filed. If the change of venue
has not yet become effective when the notice or petition is filed,
appellate jurisdiction lies in the district court of appeal which serves as
the appellate court for the transferor court. That district court of appeal
shall retain jurisdiction of the matter before it even though the change
of venue is later effected. Once the change of venue has become
effective, appellate jurisdiction shall be in the district court of appeal
which serves as the district court of appeal for the transferee court, even
if the challenged order was entered before the change of venue. Of
140. Id. at 66.
141. Id. (footnotes omitted).
142. Id.
143. Tremblay, 642 So. 2d at 66.
144. 631 So. 2d 1082 (Fa. 1994).
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course, the time for filing appeals and petitions for certiorari shall run
from the date of the challenged order.1
4 5
The First District was called upon to interpret one aspect of Vasilinda
in Cottingham v. State. 46 In that case, an inverse condemnation matter,
a circuit judge in Hernando County, which is located within the Fifth
District, entered an order transferring venue to Leon County, which is
located within the First District. 47 The order provided that the plaintiffs
should pay the service charge to the clerk of court of Hernando County and
directed the clerk to effect the transfer to Leon County upon proof of
payment of the service charge. 48 Before the service charge was paid, the
clerk mailed the file to Leon County. 49 The clerk of court in Leon
County advised the appellants by telephone that the file had been received
and that payment of a transfer fee was required. 50 The following day,
counsel for appellants sent a notice of appeal by overnight mail to the clerk
for Hemando County.' Later that day, counsel mailed the transfer fee to
the clerk for Leon County.' 52 The fee was accompanied by a .letter
explaining that a notice of appeal had been filed in the circuit court of
Hernando County, appealing the case to the Fifth District.' The notice
of appeal was received by the clerk in Hernando County, and four days
later, the transfer fee was received by the clerk in Leon County.s 4
The State filed a motion to dismiss in the Fifth District, erroneously
asserting that the required fee had been paid four days before the notice of
appeal was mailed. 5 5 The Fifth District denied the motion, but transferred
the appeal to the First District.'56 The First District concluded that
because the notice of appeal was filed in the circuit court in Hernando
County before the transfer fee was received in Leon County, jurisdiction of
145. Id. at 1087 (footnotes omitted).
146. 656 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
147. Id. at 598.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Cottingham, 656 So. 2d at 598.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Cottingham, 656 So. 2d at 598.
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the appeal lay solely in the Fifth District,157 and transferred the case back
to that court. 58
The court rejected the argument that the transfer was complete when
the transfer fee was mailed,'59 but certified the following question as one
of great public importance:
FOR PURPOSES OF THE RULE ANNOUNCED IN VASILINDA V.
LOZANO, 631 SO.2D 1082 (FLA. 1994), IS THE DATE OF PAY-
MENT OF THE TRANSFER FEES AND CHARGES THE DATE OF
RECEIPT OF SUCH CHARGES BY THE TRANSFEREE COURT OR
THE DATE OF MAILING BY THE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR
PAYMENT? 60
VIII. NOTICE OF APPEAL
A. Impact of a Notice of Appeal on Pending Motions
in the Trial Court
The Fourth District, in Kennedy v. Alberto,'6' addressed the question
of whether pending post-judgment motions which do not delay rendition of
the judgment, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g)(3),
are deemed abandoned by the filing of a notice of appeal directed to the
judgment.' 62 The court initially recognized that the post-judgment motions
named in rule 9.020(g) that suspend rendition of the judgment to which they
are directed are considered abandoned by the filing of a notice of appeal
before their disposition. 163 These motions are timely and authorized "for
new trial or rehearing, clarification, or certification; motions to alter or
amend; for judgment notwithstanding verdict or in accordance with prior
motion for directed verdict, or in arrest of judgment; or a challenge to the
verdictd.5
'64
157. Id. at 599.
158. Id. at 597.
159. Id. at 599.
160. Id.
161. 649 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
162. Id. at 287.
163. Id.
164. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.0 20(g).
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Noting that the case under review was not concerned with one of the
orders set forth in the rule, but with a motion for relief from judgment under
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b),165 the court stated:
We do not believe, therefore, that motions filed after final
judgment which are not named in rule 9.020(g) and do not suspend
rendition are deemed abandoned by a later filed notice of appeal
directed to the judgment itself. Among this class of motions are
motions for writ of garnishment, motions to tax costs or award
attorney's fees, motions for proceedings supplementary, and motions for
relief from judgment under rule 1.540(b).'66
The Second District also dealt with the impact of a notice of appeal on
a pending motion. In Rice v. Brown,67 the court concluded that the filing
of a notice of appeal from a final judgment and the denial of a motion for
new trial constituted an abandonment of a motion for remittitur and divested
the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on that motion.168
B. Filing in the Proper Court
In Upshaw v. State,169 the appellant sought to appeal an order entered
by the Circuit Court for Eighth Judicial Circuit in Baker County. 7 A
notice of appeal was filed with the court clerk in Alachua County, which is
also located in the Eighth Circuit.' Although efforts to do so may have
been made by the appellant and by the Alachua County court clerk, no
notice was ever filed with the Baker County court clerk.'72 The First Dis-
trict refused to consider the appeal, holding "that when a party initiates an
appeal.., by filing a notice of appeal in circuit court, the notice must be
filed in the circuit court in the county where the original proceeding was
165. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d at 288. As the court noted, not only is such a motion not set
forth in the appellate rule as one which delays rendition of a judgment, but rule 1.540(b)
expressly states that "[a] motion under this sub-division does not affect the finality of a
judgment or decree or suspend its operation." Id. (quoting FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.540(b)).
166. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d at 288.
167. 645 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 658 So. 2d 992 (Fla.
1995).
168. Id. at 1021.
169. 641 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1994).
170. Id. at 452.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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pending to validly invoke appellate jurisdiction." '73 The court recognized
that the supreme court has liberally construed the appellate rules "to allow
valid invocation of appellate jurisdiction when an appellant or petitioner has
not strictly filed the notice in the correct court,"'74 but pointed out that
those supreme court cases involved situations in which the party invoking
appellate jurisdiction filed a timely notice either with the district court of
appeal or with the correct lower tribunal.'75 "In this case," the court
concluded, "petitioner did neither, so we are without jurisdiction of the
appeal."' 1
76
C. Timeliness
In Metropolitan Dade County v. Vasquez,7 7 the appellant, on the last
day for filing a timely notice of appeal, forwarded its notice to a private
carrier with directions to deliver it that day to the Judge of Compensation
Claims.178  The courier did not reach the building housing the judge's
office until 5:05 p.m. and the security guard would not permit her to enter
the building or leave the package at the building site.'79 The appellee then
moved to dismiss, arguing that the notice, which was filed on the next
business day, three days later, was not timely filed. 8' The appellant
maintained that because the notice was delivered for filing within the
required period, it should be treated as timely.''
The First District dismissed the appeal, finding that the "attempt to
deliver a notice of appeal" under the circumstances of the case was not
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.8 2 In doing so, the court
stated: "A party who waits until the last available day to file its notice of
appeal, and who fails to assure that the notice is delivered prior to the close
of the business day bears the risk that it will be denied access to file the
notice 'after hours. '" 8
3
173. Id.
174. Upshaw, 641 So. 2d at 453 (citing Alfonso v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 616
So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1993); Skinner v. Skinner, 561 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1990); Johnson v. Citizens
State Bank, 537 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989)).
175. Upshaw, 641 So. 2d at 453.
176. Id.
177. 659 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
178. Id. at 355.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Vasquez, 659 So. 2d at 356.
183. Id.
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D. Amended Judgments
In Wetherington v. Minch, 84 the appellant did not timely appeal from
a final judgment of foreclosure, but attempted to appeal from an amended
final judgment which changed the sale date and awarded additional
interest. 85 The Fifth District first noted that the amendment of a final
judgment which does not change matters of substance or resolve a genuine
ambiguity does not toll the time within which the parties must seek
review."86 The court then pointed out that an appeal from an amended
final judgment is "'limited to the party adversely affected by the amendment
and should involve only those issues affected by the amendment."'187
Since the appellant raised no challenges involving the amendments, and
failed to timely appeal the original judgment, the court dismissed the
appeal.18
8
E. Amendment of Notice of Appeal
The Third District, in Ashraf v. Smith,"8 9 denied a motion to amend
a notice of appeal to include the appellant's insurer.Y Although the court
found the amendment "entirely unnecessary" under the facts of the case, the
denial of the motion was based on the court's determination that it "lack[ed]
the jurisdiction to permit such an amendment.''.
IX. INDIGENCY
In Schwab v. Brevard County School Board,"g the Fifth District dealt
with a contention that a 1994 amendment to section 57.08 1(1) of the Florida
Statutes lifted the burden of determining indigency for purposes of appeal
from the circuit court and allows individuals to proceed as indigents upon
the filing by counsel of a certificate of indigency in the appellate court. 93
Prior to the amendment, the statute required an indigent person to submit an
184. 637 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
185. Id. at 967.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting First Continental Corp. v. Khan, 605 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1992)).
188. Id.
189. 647 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 658 So. 2d 989 (Fla.
1995).
190. Id. at 893.
191. Id.
192. 650 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
193. Id. at 1101.
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affidavit of indigency and, if represented by counsel, a certificate from
counsel indicating, among other things, that counsel had made an investiga-
tion to ascertain the truth of the affidavit and believed it to be true. 94 The
amended statute eliminates the requirement of an affidavit if the attorney
files a certificate certifying that the attorney has made an investigation to
ascertain the financial condition of the client and has found the client to be
indigent.19
5
The court rejected the contention that in light of the change, the trial
court was no longer required to make a determination of indigency.' 96
The court pointed out that although the old version of the statute did not
specify where the determination of indigency should be made, the court in
Chappell v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,197 had
concluded that a party seeking to obtain a waiver of appellate court fees
must file a motion in the lower tribunal, along with the affidavit and
certificate required by the statute.198  The court then stated that "[t]he
amendments to the statute reflect a change in the requirements an indigent
person must meet in order to be exempt from payment of charges,"' 99 not
the question of "where such a determination must be made.' ' °
This determination, the court continued, is procedural in nature and is
therefore governed by the procedural rules promulgated by the supreme
court.20' Among those rules, the court noted, are Florida Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 9.430, which requires a party who has the right to seek
review without the payment of costs to file a motion in the lower tribunal,
and Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.040(b)(3), which states that
fees will be paid as provided by law except when a party has been
194. FLA. STAT. § 57.081(1) (1980). Counsel was also required to certify that he or she
had investigated the nature of the applicant's position, that, in counsel's opinion, the position
was meritorious as a matter of law, that counsel had not been paid or promised payment of
any remuneration for services, and that counsel intended to act as attorney for the applicant
without compensation.
195. Schwab, 650 So. 2d at 1101-02 (citing FLA. STAT. § 57.081 (Supp. 1994)). The
revised statute retains the additional requirements for the certificate that are set forth in the
preceding footnote.
196. Id. at 1102.
197. 391 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
198. Schwab, 650 So. 2d at 1101.
199. Id. at 1102.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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"adjudicated insolvent."2°  Each of these rules, the court concluded,
contemplates some action being taken by the lower tribunal.20 3
Citing to Schwab and to the two above-noted rules, the Fourth District,
in McFadden v. West Palm Beach Police Officer,2" indicated that it found
no authority for appellate courts to sua sponte determine the issue of
indigency in direct appeals.2 ' The court contrasted this fact with the its
authority in original proceedings to issue orders of indigency.2" The court
then stated:
A welcome change in the rule to allow the clerks of the appellate court
to determine indigency from the affidavit, providing for a remand to the
trial court for a hearing on indigency where indicated by the circum-
stances of the case or the affidavit, would allow indigents more
expeditious access to the court without a significant burden.2'
In Keene v. Nudera,°8 the Second District set forth the "procedures
for filing appeals and original proceedings for indigent clients in civil
cases."2" With regard to appeals, the court stated:
An attorney who plans to appeal an order for an indigent client must
timely file a motion in the trial court requesting an order of indigency
for purposes of appeal. That order must be obtained either before filing
the notice of appeal or shortly thereafter. If the indigency order is not
obtained prior to the commencement of the appeal, the attorney should
advise this court in writing concerning the status of that order. Attor-
neys should be aware the rules of appellate procedure do not require the
lower tribunal to automatically send this court a copy of such an order.
It is the appellant's responsibility to provide this court with a copy of
the order of indigency. This court will normally dismiss an appeal after
thirty days' notice if the filing fee is not paid or an order of indigency
is not filed.210
202. Id.
203. Schwab, 650 So. 2d at 1102.
204. 658 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
205. Id. at 1048.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1232 (2d Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1995).
209. Id at D1232.
210. Id. at D1233.
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With regard to original proceedings, the court noted that the great
majority of such cases "seek review of orders entered by circuit courts, as
'lower tribunals.""'21 In light of the language of Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.430, which states that a party who has a right to "seek review"
without payment of costs shall file a motion in the lower tribunal, the court
concluded that "a circuit court, as the lower tribunal, is authorized to enter
an order of indigency for an original proceeding, just as it must resolve that
issue for a direct appeal of a final or nonfinal order." '212
The court pointed out, however, that there are situations, such as cases
in which mandamus or prohibition is sought, in which it may not be feasible
to obtain an order from the lower tribunal.213 Additionally, the court
recognized that in some instances, an original proceeding is filed to
challenge the decision of a governmental entity that is defined as a "lower
tribunal," but is not a typical judicial forum. 2 4 In light of situations such
as these, the court stated: "To assure access to this court, we allow
petitioners to file their motion for an order of indigency, along with a
sufficient affidavit, in this court even when a 'lower tribunal' may ex-
ist."2
15
The court indicated that a motion filed in the appellate court should
accompany the petition and that, as with direct appeals, an original
proceeding will normally be dismissed after thirty days' notice if the filing
fee is not paid or if a sufficient motion and affidavit is not filed with the
court.2 16 The court also noted that neither the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure nor the most frequently used Florida practice manuals contain
forms useful in obtaining an order of indigency for appeal.21 7 Therefore,
the court appended to its opinion a form affidavit2 8 and a form order2'9
for use in such situations.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Keene, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D1234.
214. Id. at D1233-34.
215. Id. at D1234.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Keene, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D1234-35.
219. Id. at D1234.
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X. MOTIONS
In Sarasota County v. Ex,22° the Second District prefaced its discus-
sion of the merits of the case with some comments about the "tendency for
motions to proliferate because lawyers simply will not permit an adversary
to have the last word." 22' The court's concern grew from a series of
pleadings that included a motion to strike two notices of supplemental
authority, a reply to that motion, a motion to strike the reply, and a response
to the motion to strike the reply.22 The court pointed out that none of the
filings were necessary or helpful to the court22 3 and stated: "Lawyers
need to realize that appellate motion practice is not a game of ping-pong in
which the last lawyer to serve wins. 2 24 The court went on to say: "In
most cases, motions to strike motions and other similar pleadings are simply
unauthorized responses that demonstrate an attorney's lack of self-disci-
pline.225
XI. TRANSCRIPTS
A number of cases dealt with the absence of a transcript as a part of
the record on appeal. The manner in which such absences were dealt with
varied depending upon the facts of the case and the nature of the issues
raised. In some instances, courts relied upon the principle that when an
error is apparent on the face of the judgment, reversal is appropriate despite
the lack of a transcript.226 Similarly, other cases concluded that when the
record provided was sufficient to review a legal issue on the merits, the
absence of a trial transcript,27 or a portion of the transcript, did not
require affirmance.228 " Other factual situations, however, led to conclusions
that cases should be affirmed because of the lack of a transcript. Such
conclusions were reached in cases in which appellants failed to provide
220. 645 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 918 (Fla.
1995).
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id. at 8.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 7-8.
225. Sarasota County, 645 So. 2d at 8.
226. Sugrim v. Sugrim, 649 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Hirsch v.
Hirsch, 642 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
227. In re Estate of Smith, 644 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
228. Velez v. State, 645 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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transcripts of evidentiary hearings that formed the basis for factual findings
by a trial court229 or an appeals referee.230
In Selig v. Sandier,231 the Third District affirmed trial court orders
striking a complaint as a sham pleading when the appellant failed to provide
the court "with a transcript of the evidentiary hearing or a proper substi-
tute.
232
In two other cases, courts found that items offered by appellants in lieu
of transcripts did not constitute substitutes that were sufficiently proper to
allow for review of either the entire case or of certain issues. In All
American Soup and Salad, Inc. v. Colonial Promenade,233 the Fifth
District found to be without merit the appellant's contention that its written
closing argument was a "proper substitute" for a transcript of a non-jury
trial." In Travieso v. Golden,235 the appellant submitted nine video-
tapes of deposition testimony as a substitute for a transcript. The Fourth
District noted its "disapproval of this procedure,2 36 and stated:
The use of videotapes on appeal in lieu of a written transcript is
not authorized by any rule and would be counterproductive to efficient
review by the court. We judges can digest a transcript covering a day's
worth of trial with far more dispatch than we can watch the same events
unfold on eight hours of videotape. While video may eventually
provide useful supplements to a written record, efficient use of appellate
court time requires the submission of a written transcript of trial
proceedings.237
XII. BRIEFS
A. Cross-References
In its consideration of two separate death penalty appeals taken by the
same defendant, the supreme court discussed issues relating to the practice
229. Huey v. Huey, 643 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
230. Wolfson v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 649 So. 2d 363, 363 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
231. 642 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.
1995).
232. Id. at 766.
233. 652 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
234. Id. at 912.
235. 643 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
236. Id. at 1136.
237. Id.
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of referring in a brief to briefs and records in other cases. In Johnson v.
State,23 the court stated that "cross-referenc[ing] a brief from a separate
case is impermissible under any circumstances because it may confuse
factually inapposite cases, it leaves appellate courts the task of determining
which issues are relevant (which is counsel's role), and it circumvents the
page-limit requirements. 239 The court went on to hold that the proper
method of bringing before the court matters that are contained in separate
records of pending cases is by way of a motion to supplement the record,
not by a request for the taking of judicial notice.2' The court stated that
"any attempt to cross-reference separate records of pending cases will
constitute grounds for the opposing party to move to strike the cross-
reference. '2 41 Further, the court indicated that "[a]ny order striking a cross
reference shall constitute automatic notice to counsel that the record must
be supplemented" and that the failure to supplement under such circumstanc-
es will work a procedural bar as to the matters at issue in the improperly
cross-referenced material.242
In the same defendant's companion appeal, Johnson v. State,243 the
court addressed the defendant's request that the court consider issues raised
in his other case.2"4 Concluding that "it clearly is not proper for counsel
to attempt to cross-reference issues from a brief in a distinct case pending
in the same court," the court found that all available issues not raised in the
briefs filed in the case were barred.245
B. Cross-Reply Briefs
In The Katz Family Partnership v. Placenti,246 the Third District
acknowledged that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 on its face
gives the impression that a cross-reply brief may be filed as a matter of
course in an appellate proceeding,247 but concluded that such briefs may
only be filed if there is a cross-appeal.241 The issue apparently arose from
238. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S347 (July 13, 1995).
239. Id. at S348.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S343 (July 13, 1995).
244. Id. at S345.
245. Id.
246. 648 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
247. Id. at 296.
248. Id. at 297 n.1.
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the wording of rule 9.130(e), which establishes the time for the filing of
appellants' initial briefs in appeals from non-final orders, but which goes on
to state that "[a]dditional briefs shall be served as prescribed by rule
9.210.,,249 Rule 9.210 establishes the general time requirements for
serving briefs and includes such a requirement for the service of cross-reply
briefs.250  As noted and relied upon by the Third District,21 however,
the 1977 committee note to rule 9.210 refers to the fact that a cross-reply
brief may be filed "if a cross-appeal or petition has been filed. 252
XIII. ORAL ARGUMENT BY VIDEO TELECONFERENCE NETWORK
The First District broke new ground by establishing a procedure to
conduct oral arguments by the use of a video teleconferencing network. 53
In its administrative order governing such arguments, the court indicated that
video teleconferencing equipment was being installed in Jacksonville,
Orlando, West Palm Beach, Miami, Ft. Myers, and Tampa. 54 The court
stated that "all requests for oral argument from attorneys located in or near
these cities will be deemed to request oral argument by use of the video
teleconference network unless the request explicitly specifies that the oral
argument be held in the courtroom at Tallahassee, Florida,' 255 where the
court is located. The court further indicated that, "[i]nitially, argument by
video teleconference network will be granted only when all the attorneys
expected to present argument are located near a single remote facility," but
that, in the future, "the court expects to schedule attorneys at two or more
remote facilities.2 56 The administrative order requires the party request-
ing argument to submit to the clerk of the court, within ten days of the order
granting oral argument, a fee in the amount specified in the order to cover
the costs of the video teleconference for that argument.257 Failure to
submit the fee, which will be taxable as costs in favor of the prevailing
party, will be deemed a waiver of the request for oral argument. 58 Fees
249. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(e).
250. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(f).
251. Katz Family Partnership, 648 So. 2d at 297 n.1.
252. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210 (1977 comm. notes).
253. In re Oral Argument By Video Teleconference Network, 648 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
254. Id. at 763.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Oral Argument, 648 So. 2d at 763.
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will be nonrefundable if oral argument is canceled at the request of the
parties, but they will be refunded if oral argument is canceled by the
courtL5 9 The court also noted that it may, on its own motion, require that
oral argument be conducted in Tallahassee,2' 6 and that it will also continue
to schedule oral arguments throughout the district as provided in section
35.11 of the Florida Statutes.261
XIV. CERTIORARI REVIEW OF A DECISION OF A CIRCUIT COURT
ACTING IN ITS APPELLATE CAPACITY
The supreme court, in Haines City Community Development v.
Heggs,262 clarified the standard of review for a district court to apply when
reviewing a decision of a circuit court acting in its appellate capacity. After
discussing the history of the common law writ of certiorari in Florida,
2 63
the court focused its attention on two of its previous decisions that had used
different language in setting forth the appropriate standard.2"
In Combs v. State,26' a case in which the circuit court had reviewed
by appeal a county court conviction for driving while intoxicated, the
supreme court had concluded that "a district court's review of an appellate
circuit court decision should determine whether there was a 'departure from
the essential requirements of law.""'2 The court "emphasized that there
must be 'a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a
miscarriage of justice."'267
Subsequently, in Educational Development Center v. City of West Palm
Beach,261 a case in which the circuit court had reviewed by certiorari a
decision of an administrative agency, the supreme court, relying on City of
Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant,269 concluded that "a district court's review of
an appellate circuit court's decision which reviewed an administrative
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995).
263. Id. at 525.
264. Id. at 528-29.
265. 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983).
266. Haines City, 658 So. 2d at 529 (quoting Combs, 436 So. 2d at 95).
267. Id. (quoting Combs, 436 So. 2d at 96).
268. 541 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1989).
269. 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982).
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agency decision should consider whether the 'circuit court afforded
procedural due process and applied the correct law.""'27
The question the court addressed in Haines City was "whether these
two standards are different, and, if so, whether a difference is justified."27'
The court answered by indicating that "'appl[ying] the correct law' is
synonymous with 'observing the essential requirements of law"' and that,
"[t]herefore, when the Combs and EDC standards are reduced to their core,
they appear to be the same. 272 Thus, the court found that the standard for
a district court is the same regardless of whether the circuit court reviewed
a matter by appeal or by certiorari. As set forth in Haines City, the standard
is as follows: "The inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded
procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law.
As explained above, these two components are merely expressions of ways
in which the circuit court decision may have departed from the essential
requirements of the law. 273 The court went on to give some insight into
the nature of the standard:
This standard, while narrow, also contains a degree of flexibility
and discretion. For example, a reviewing court is drawing new lines
and setting judicial policy as it individually determines those errors
sufficiently egregious or fundamental to merit the extra review and
safeguard provided by certiorari. This may not always be easy since the
errors in question must be viewed in the context of the individual case.
It may also be true that review of administrative decisions may be more
difficult, since care must be exercised to determine the nature of the
administrative proceeding under review, and to distinguish between
quasi-judicial proceedings and those legislative in nature. There is no
complete catalog that the court can turn to in resolving a particular
case.
274
XV. STANDING
Lack of standing has caused the appellate courts to refuse to reach the
merits in several cases. In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services
v. B.S.,275 the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services sought
270. Haines City, 658 So. 2d at 529.
271. Id. at 529-30 (footnote omitted).
272. Id. at 530.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 530-31 (footnote omitted).
275. 640 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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certiorari review of an order adjudicating a minor delinquent and detaining
him pending disposition 6 The minor neither appealed nor sought release
by way of habeas corpus.2' The court denied certiorari27 because it
concluded that the claimed procedural problems and statutory violations
"would have to be raised by someone with standing to argue on the minor's
behalf."279
In O'Neal v. Sun Bank,280 the court concluded that individuals against
whom a foreclosure action was brought lacked standing to appeal an order
allowing settlement between two creditors of a dispute as to the priority of
certain portions of receivership funds, when the individuals claimed no
entitlement of those funds.281
In Bodenstab v. Department of Professional Regulation,8 2 the court
dismissed an appeal from an order reconsidering an earlier negative
determination and finding the appellant, a physician, eligible for licensure
by endorsement in Florida.283 On appeal, the appellant argued that the
Board of Medicine had repudiated a stipulation by failing to incorporate in
its order certain new evidence that was favorable to him.28 The court
concluded that since the appellant had been granted licensure, he was not
"adversely affected" by the Board's order,28 5 and therefore, not entitled to
seek review pursuant to section 120.68(1) of the Florida Statutes,286 which
governs appeals of the sort presented by the case.
XVI. IMPACT OF PRIOR DETERMINATIONS
A. Law of the Case
In State v. Owen,28 7 the Fourth District dealt with a situation in which
a criminal defendant faced a retrial after the Supreme Court of Florida
276. Id. at 1175.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1176.
279. Id. at 1175.
280. 644 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
281. Id. at 178.
282. 648 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 659 So. 2d 1085 (Fla.
1995).
283. Id. at 742.
284. Id. at 743.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 654 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1995).
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reversed his conviction due to its conclusion that the defendant's confession
was improperly admitted into evidence. 2"8  After the reversal, but before
the retrial, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision that
demonstrated that the confession was admissible as a matter of federal
constitutional law.2 9  The trial court refused a request by the State to
reconsider the admissibility of the confession in light of the new prece-
dent29 and the State sought certiorari review.291
After noting concern about whether certain precedent might compel the
conclusion that the confession would be inadmissible under the Florida
Constitution, the court found that it was the law of the case that the
confession was inadmissible.2 2 The court pointed out that the Supreme
Court of Florida could revisit the issue because appellate courts have "the
power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings notwithstanding that such
rulings have become the law of the case.2 93 The court therefore denied
certiorari, 2" but provided an opportunity for the issue to be reopened by
certifying a question of great public importance that asked whether the
principles of the federal case were applicable in light of the precedent
dealing with the question under the Florida Constitution.295
The law of the case doctrine was also applied in White v. State,296
when a criminal defendant attempted to raise on a motion to correct an
illegal sentence, an issue that had been previously raised in a direct appeal
that had been decided without an opinion by a per curiam affirmance. 297
The Fifth District stated: "A per curiam decision even without opinion
establishes the law of the case on the same issues and facts which were
raised or which could have been raised. 298
B. Res Judicata
In Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco v. McKesson Corp.,99
which, for reasons which will soon become apparent, will hereinafter be
288. Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990).
289. State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d at 201.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 202.
293. Id. (quoting Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1984)).
294. State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d at 201.
295. Id.
296. 651 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
297. Id. at 726.
298. Id.
299. 643 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
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referred to as McKesson IV, the court wrote the latest, and possibly final,
chapter to a saga that began when two alcoholic beverage distributors,
McKesson and Tampa Crown, separately challenged certain statutory
provisions that provided for preferential tax treatment to distributors of
alcoholic beverages made from products grown in Florida.3"
In each case, the trial court entered a final and partial summary
judgment invalidating the taxing scheme on Commerce Clause grounds, but
made its ruling prospective in nature and thus denied each distributor's
request for a tax refund."' In each case, the Division of Alcoholic
Beverages and Tobacco appealed the Commerce Clause ruling and the
distributor cross-appealed the prospective application ruling.3" The First
District consolidated the two appeals and certified the case to the Supreme
Court of Florida, 3 which affirmed the trial court's rulings in Division of
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corp. ("McKesson ")."0
McKesson alone sought review in the Supreme Court of the United
States, which, in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco ("McKesson II"),301 struck that portion of McKesson I which had
granted only prospective relief.3°6
Following remand to the Supreme Court of Florida, the division
announced a proposed remedy and the court, in Division of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco v. McKesson Corp. ("McKesson III"),3"7 remanded
the case to the trial court to determine whether the chosen remedy satisfied
minimum constitutional requirements.08
Tampa Crown then filed a petition before the trial court seeking to
appear in the proceeding." 9 The division opposed the petition, asserting,
among other grounds, that because Tampa Crown had not pursued the case
to the Supreme Court of the United States, McKesson I was res judicata
insofar as Tampa Crown's claim for relief.310 The trial court granted
300. Id. at 18.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), rev'd, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), on remand to 574 So. 2d
114 (Fla. 1991), on remand to 643 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
305. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
306. Id. at 31.
307. 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991).
308. McKesson IV, 643 So. 2d at 18.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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Tampa Crown's petition, and the First District was called upon to review the
propriety of that ruling.31'
The court concluded that because Tampa Crown did not seek review
of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in McKesson I in the Supreme
Court of the United States, Tampa Crown "must be considered to have
accepted that decision and, therefore, to have no interest in any remaining
litigation."31 2 Given that fact, the court found the decision in McKesson
I to be res judicata as to Tampa Crown.313
The court rejected Tampa Crown's contention that it continued to have
an interest in the case because United States Supreme Court Rule 12.4
provides that all parties to the proceeding in a lower court are deemed
parties in the Supreme Court unless the petitioner notifies the clerk of the
Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the
parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition.1 4
The court acknowledged that rule 12.4 offered "superficial support"
315
to Tampa Crown's position and that it had found no cases directly on
point.31 6 'The court nonetheless concluded that Tampa Crown "was
required to take some affirmative act before the United States Supreme
Court,, 3 1  such as "filing either a notice informing the clerk of its continu-
ing interest in the case or a brief adopting McKesson's brief' 31 for its
refund request to survive.
XVII. MOOTNESS
Cases deemed moot by the appellate courts included the following:
James Mitchell & Co. v. Gallagher.319 The court found that state-
ments made by an individual, as the state insurance commissioner, could
have served as the basis for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to
disqualify him from issuing a final order, but went on to hold that the issue
311. Id.
312. Id. at 20.
313. McKesson IV, 643 So. 2d at 20.
314. Id. at 18-19.
315. Id. at 19.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. McKesson IV, 643 So. 2d at 19.
319. 651 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 659 So. 2d 1087 (Fla.
1995).
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was rendered moot by the fact that the individual involved no longer held
that office.32
Future Medical Technologies International, Inc. v. Sanders.32' A
case seeking certiorari review of an order requiring production of informa-
tion claimed to be privileged was deemed moot when the trial court stayed
its order of production to allow for appellate review, but before such review
was completed, the case went to trial without the information being
provided.31 The court found that by proceeding to trial without produc-
tion, the respondent had waived the right to have the information pro-
duced.32
Metropolitan Dade County v. Knight.3 An appeal from an order to
a county to pay costs in a criminal case was considered moot, because the
county had paid the costs at issue.3
XVIIL. PER CURIAM AFFIRMANCE WITHOUT OPINION
In Elliott v. Elliott,3 the court entered a per curiam affirmance
without opinion. 27 The appellant's counsel filed a motion for rehearing
that the court characterized as "rearguing the merits of the case in an effort
to persuade the court to change its mind,"328 and as "express[ing] displea-
sure with and chastis[ing] the lower court, the appellee and this court. 329
The court indicated that the tone and tenor of the motion was perhaps best
reflected by the following language in the initial statement made by the
appellant:
After a Judgement (sic) that was a travesty; an Answer Brief filled with
hyperbole and falsehood; and this Court's superficial and shallow
review, the appellant can now only pray for simple fairness and
equity.330
320. Id. at 701.
321. 651 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
322. Id. at 250.
323. Id.
324. 640 So. 2d 90 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
325. Id. at 90.
326. 648 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1994).
327. Id. at 135.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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Noting that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330 commands that
motions for rehearing not reargue the merits of the court's order,33 ' the
court found the motion to be "a personification of the very conduct found
by the appellate courts to constitute a flagrant violation of the rule. 332
The court thus denied the motion for rehearing and ordered counsel to show
cause why sanctions should not be imposed.333
In his response to the order to show cause, appellant's counsel
expressed his apologies, and indicated that he intended no disrespect to the
court, the lower court or opposing counsel.334 The court indicated that
"[h]ad counsel simply ended there (leaving well enough alone), the matter
would have been adequately addressed and put to rest. 335 Counsel went
on, however, "to explain what prompted his argumentative and overzealous
motion for rehearing, namely, the fact that the court's opinion 'was a simple
per curiam affirmance of the trial court's Final Judgment, and the under-
signed attorney found it impossible to discern the Court's reasoning. '336
The response also stated that "'the undersigned attorney was extremely
surprised at this Court's per curiam affirmance and presumed that his
argument had been overlooked by this Court.' ' 337
The court found this to be "a most disturbing revelation, 338 and
stated: "The notion that an appellate practitioner would view a per curiam
disposition, without opinion, as lacking in meaningful review is absolutely
astounding. '339 The court opined that "[p]erhaps appellate counsel should
not be faulted for this misconceived view of a per curiam affirmance,
without opinion.,,3' Rather, the court stated:
Perhaps the fault lies with the law school curriculum, the continuing
legal education programs offered by the Florida Bar, or by the appellate
courts themselves, in not engendering a sense of confidence that the
absence of a written opinion is not akin to a superficial treatment, and
331. Elliot, 648 So. 2d at 135.
332. Id. at 136.
333. Id.
334. Elliot v. Elliot, 648 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Elliot II, 648 So. 2d at 138.
340. Id.
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in leaving the bar with the unfounded notion that the court "did not read
the briefs." 34
"Perhaps," the opinion went on to say, "the court needs simply to restate the
fundamental proposition that each and every appeal receives the same degree
of attention and that a per curiam affirmance without opinion is not an
indication of any kind of lesser treatment. 342 The court concluded its
discussion by accepting counsel's apology and declining to impose
sanctions.343
XIX. REHEARING
In 3299 N. Federal Highway, Inc. v. Board of County Commission-
ers,3" the Fourth District dealt with the issue of whether an opinion
denying a motion for rehearing becomes effective immediately or whether
there is some period of time provided for the filing of a second motion for
rehearing or clarification.345 The issue arose after the court entered an
initial opinion and the appellants filed motions for rehearing. The court
denied the motions in an opinion that certified a question of great public
importance on the court's own motion and that corrected a factual error
from the original opinion.3 6 The second opinion "did not change the
substance or effect" of the original opinion. 47
The finality of the second opinion became an issue in two respects.
First, two days after the second opinion was filed, arrests were made under
the ordinance at issue in the case.348 A stay of enforcement had precluded
such arrests during the pendency of the case, but the initial opinion had
vacated that stay.349 Second, the appellants filed a motion for clarification
directed to the second opinion.
The court noted that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330(b)
allows a party to file just one motion for rehearing or for clarification of a
341. Id.
342. Id. at 139.
343. Id.
344. 646 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
345. Id. at 215.
346. Id. at 227-28.
347. Id. at 228.
348. Id.
349. 3299, 646 So. 2d at 228.
350. Id.
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decision,351 and stated that "[a]n exception to the rule has been recognized
where on the first motion for rehearing, the court changes its previous
ruling." '352 The court found that since it did not change the result or
reasoning of its initial opinion, the portion of the initial opinion vacating the
stay became final and enforcement of the ordinance became appropriate.353
The court did consider the motion for clarification, but only because the
second opinion was erroneously rubber stamped by the clerk with a standard
indication that the opinion was not final until the expiration of the time to
seek rehearing or until the disposition of any such motion.3" Clearly, the
lesson of 3299 is that absent such a stamp, a motion for rehearing or
clarification under similar circumstances would be inappropriate.
XX. ADMINISTRATIVE APPELLATE PRACTICE
A. Review of Non-Final Administrative Orders
In Florida Leisure Acquisition Corp. v. Florida Commission on Human
Relations,355 the appellant sought review of a non-final order rejecting a
recommendation of a hearing officer who had concluded that the appellant
had not engaged in a racially discriminatory employment practice .356 The
order in question remanded the matter to the hearing officer for a hearing
on damages.357 The court recognized that "jurisdiction lies in the district
court to immediately review a non-final administrative order if review of the
final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy. 358 It conclud-
ed, however, that the appellant in the case under consideration would not be
deprived of an adequate remedy if appellate review was delayed until after
the final order determining all issues. 9 The court stated: "The necessity
of trying a case to conclusion before obtaining redress on appeal from an
erroneous interlocutory ruling of the lower court does not make the remedyinadequate. ' '31°
351. Id.
352. Id. at 228-29 (citing Dade Fed. Say. & Loan v. Smith, 403 So. 2d 995, 999 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
353. Id. at 229.
354. 3299, 646 So. 2d at 229.
355. 639 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
356. Id. at 1028.
357. Id.
358. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(2); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(a),(c)); FLA. STAT.
§ 120.68(1) (1993).
359. Id. at 1029.
360. Florida Leisure, 639 So. 2d at 1029.
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The court was not swayed by the fact that interlocutory appeals can be
taken in civil cases from orders determining liability. The court pointed out
that the supreme court interpreted such appeals as being specifically
authorized by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), and
that non-final administrative orders are not reviewable under that rule.
61
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In Berkowitz v. City of Tamarac,362 the City sold to the appellant
property on which it was operating some of its public works.363  The
property was leased back to the City until it could move the public works
into a new facility, which was not yet completed. 36' The lease provided
that the City would repurchase the property if, during the term of the lease,
the City effectuated either an adverse change in zoning to the premises, the
imposition of any additional governmental restrictions, or requirements
which would prohibit or materially and adversely affect the appellant's
intended development so that such development would become economically
unfeasible.365
The appellant filed a complaint which alleged that the City adopted a
comprehensive land use plan that contained restrictions that made his
intended development economically unfeasible.3' He sought money
damages and rescission.367 The trial court dismissed the case because the
appellant had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not seeking
relief from the restrictions.368
The Fourth District reversed, concluding that because the appellant was
seeking money damages and rescission, which could not be obtained in an
administrative proceeding, he was not required to exhaust administrative
remedies.369
361. Id.
362. 654 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
363. Id. at 982.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Berkowitz, 654 So. 2d at 982.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 983.
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C. Timeliness of Notice of Appeal
In Allen v. Live Oak Ford Mercury,370 the court rejected a claim that
Florida Administrative Code Rule 38E-2.003(3), which states that appeals
filed by mail shall be considered to have been filed when postmarked by the
United States Postal Service, could be relied upon to breathe life into a case
in which the notice of appeal that was mailed to the court was received after
the expiration of the time within which an appeal could be instituted.371
The court stated: "The administrative rule to which the appellants refer
concerns an administrative appeal in an unemployment compensation
proceeding and [this] rule is clearly not applicable in appeals taken to this
CoUrt"
37 2
D. Water Management District Emergency Orders
In West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority v. Southwest Florida
Water Management District,373 the Fifth District found that it had no
jurisdiction to review emergency orders of a water management district that
were issued pursuant to the emergency powers authority of section
373.119(2) of the Florida Statutes. The court noted that under the statute,
any person to whom an emergency order is directed is required to comply
immediately, but may also obtain a hearing before the district's governing
board "'as soon as possible.' 374 The court held that only after the evi-
dence adduced at such a hearing provides the record to support the
emergency order or cause it to be quashed is the administrative action
subject to review.375
XXI. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPELLATE PRACTICE
A. Appeals from Non-Final Orders Which Determine That a Party
Is Not Entitled to Workers' Compensation Immunity as a
Matter of Law
In Breakers Palm Beach, Inc. v. Gloger,3 6 the defendant appealed an
order denying its motion for summary judgment which was grounded on
370. 647 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
371. Id. at 1060.
372. Id. at 1061.
373. 646 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
374. Id. at 766.
375. Id.
376. 646 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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workers' compensation immunity. The trial court had denied the motion
because it concluded that there were issues of fact to be resolved.3" The
appeal was taken pursuant to the Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi), which permits appeals from non-final orders which
determine "that a party is not entitled to workers' compensation immunity
as a matter of law.'
378
The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the rule permits
review only of orders determining once and for all that there is no workers'
compensation immunity,379 and does not permit review of orders merely
determining, as did the order in the case, that the issue of workers'
compensation immunity is an issue of fact.380
The Fourth District employed a grammatical analysis in denying the
motion to dismiss. It found that if the words "as a matter of law" had been
placed at the beginning of the above-cited rule provision, the appellee's
argument would have been persuasive.381 Under that scenario, the court
concluded, the rule would permit review of non-final orders which
determine "'as a matter of law that a party is not entitled to workers'
compensation immunity."' 382 The words "'as a matter of law,"' the court
continued, would modify "'determine.'' 383 Since the key words were
placed at the end of the rule provision, however, the court found that they
modified the word "entitled" and that the provision therefore had a broader
meaning.384 That meaning, the court determined, encompassed the order
under review.385
B. Emergency Matters
In Bradley v. Hurricane Restaurant,3 6 an appeal was taken from an
order of a judge of compensation claims granting in part and denying in part
a claim for benefits found to involve an emergency.3 7 The appellees
moved to dismiss, asserting that the order was not a non-final order that can
377. Id. at 238.
378. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Breakers, 646 So. 2d at 237-38.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 237.
384. Id. at 238.
385. Id.
386. 652 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
387. Id. at 443.
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be appealed under Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure 4.160,
and that the order was not appealable as a final order because a claim for
post-surgical attendant care alleged in the original claim remained pending
and undisposed of by the appealed order.388
The court pointed to the fact that section 440.25(4)(h), Florida Statutes,
as amended by the legislature in its 1993 special session, provides that a
judge of compensation claims may have an "emergency conference when
there is a 'bona fide emergency involving the health, safety, or welfare of
an employee,"' and that "[a]n emergency conference... may result in the
entry of an order or the rendering of an adjudication by the judge of
compensation claims. '389  Given the "direct and unambiguous langu-
age"3" of this statutory provision, and the fact that the judge of compensa-
tion claims found a bona fide emergency to exist, the court concluded that
the order under review was "a final order subject to appellate review in this
CoUrt.
39 1
C. Orders Taxing Costs
In Employer's Overload of Dade County v. Robinson,392 the court
dismissed an appeal from an order taxing costs, but reserved jurisdiction to
determine entitlement to attorney's fees. The court stated: "As long as any
other matter is pending before a judge of compensation claims, an order
taxing costs is not reviewable, unless appealed as part of an adjudication on
the merits."' 3 In dismissing the case, however, the court noted that it did
not "in any way depart from the rule that a judge of compensation claims
may, in an order adjudicating the merits of a claim for benefits, reserve
jurisdiction to award attorney's fees, without affecting the finality of the
order adjudicating the merits (which may include an award of costs). 394
388. Id.
389. Id. at 444 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4)(h) (Supp. 1994)).
390. Id.
391. Bradley, 652 So. 2d at 444.
392. 642 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
393. Id. at 73.
394. Id.
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XXII. CRIINAL APPELLATE PRACTICE
A. Custody during State Appeal of Order of Dismissal
In Fontana v. Rice,395 the supreme court dealt with a certified
question that asked whether a trial court is authorized, upon a showing of
good cause, to continue a defendant on bond pending a state appeal from an
order dismissing criminal charges, or whether such a defendant must be
released on recognizance. 396  The court held that defendants must be
discharged from custody when a trial court has dismissed all criminal
charges and no new indictment or information is filed against the defen-
dant.397 The court stated that this rule applies even if the State appeals the
dismissal unless some other charge justifies a continuation of custody.39 8
The court found the issue to be controlled by Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.190(e), which states in pertinent part:
If the motion to dismiss is sustained, the court may order that the
defendant be held in custody or admitted to bail for a reasonable
specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information.
If a new indictment or information is not filed within the time specified
in the order, or within such additional time as the court may allow for
good cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged
therefrom, unless some other charge justifies a continuation in cus-
tody.39
B. Self-Representation on Appeal in Capital Cases
In Hill v. State,4" the public defender was appointed to represent the
defendant on the appeal of his conviction for first-degree murder and
sentence of death. 4 1  The defendant moved for leave to discharge the
public defender and to represent himself on appeal.4°2  Pursuant to
appointment by the supreme court, a circuit judge conducted a hearing on
the motion and determined that the defendant comprehended his constitu-
tional right to assistance of counsel in the appeal process and that he
395. 644 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1994).
396. Id. at 502.
397. Id. at 503.
398. Id.
399. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(e).
400. 656 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1995).
401. Id. at 1272.
402. Id.
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knowingly and voluntarily waived that right.4°3 The circuit judge recom-
mended that the defendant be allowed to represent himself, but that the
public defender continue in the case as "'next friend of the court."'
The supreme court noted that the right to self-representation at trial, as
recognized by Faretta v. California," is not applicable to appeals.'
The court pointed to the fact that the case was a capital appeal and indicated
that it was "concerned that it cannot properly carry out its statutory
responsibility to review Hill's conviction and sentence of death without the
skilled adversarial assistance of a lawyer acting on Hill's behalf, particularly
as it concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to convict and the proportion-
ality of the death sentence." 7 Accordingly, the court denied the appel-
lant's motion but stated that because the case was a capital case, it would
allow the appellant to file a pro se supplemental brief. 8
C. Death of Defendant during Pendency of Appeal
In Clements v. State,4" the defendant's criminal conviction was
affirmed.410 Prior to the expiration of the time for filing a motion for
rehearing, the defendant's counsel filed a motion for abatement of the appeal
ab initio on the ground that the defendant had died.4" A subsequently
filed death certificate indicated that the defendant was found dead on a date
subsequent to the affirmance and prior to the filing of the motion.42
The State responded to the motion, acknowledging the line of cases
entitling the defendant to the relief requested,413 but representing that the
supreme court, in a recent case presenting similar circumstances, Rodriguez
v. State,14 denied a motion to abate an appeal ab initio and instead
dismissed the appeal.4 1 5 The court in Clements did abate the appeal ab
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
406. Hill, 656 So. 2d at 1272.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. 652 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
410. Id. at 1295.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 648 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Bagley v. State, 122 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
414. 645 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1994).
415. Clements, 652 So. 2d at 1295.
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initio,416 but it went on to certify to the supreme court the following
question as one of great public importance:
DOES THE DEATH OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT AFTER JUDG-
MENT AND SENTENCE, BUT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
APPEAL THEREFROM, REQUIRE THE PROSECUTION TO BE
PERMANENTLY ABATED AB INITIO IN THE TRIAL AND
APPELLATE COURTS?417
The court also certified the same question in Thomas v. State,"8 a case in
which it appears that the defendant died prior to the court reaching a
determination of the case.
D. Absence of Defendant
In Jarrett v. State,419 the defendant failed to appear for a pretrial
conference and a capias for his arrest was issued.' Several days later,
with the defendant still missing, a jury was selected and sworn and the case
proceeded to trial in the absence of the defendant.42 After a conviction
on one of two charges, the defendant's counsel filed a motion for a new
trial.4 While the motion was pending, the defendant was appre-
hended.4u
After the motion was denied, an appeal followed and the First District
addressed the issue of whether it should decide the case. The court found
that unlike a situation in which an escape is from restraint after a conviction,
the defendant's absence "did not delay judgment, sentence, or time for
appeal."'4 The court thus concluded that the escape did not burden the
court system in a manner that would justify dismissal.425
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. 654 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
419. 654 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
420. Id. at 973.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 973-74.
423. Id. at 974.
424. Jarrett, 654 So. 2d at 974.
425. Id.
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E. Appeals from Rulings on Motions to Correct Illegal
Sentences
In Wright v. State,426 the Fourth District dismissed an appeal as
untimely, applying a well-settled line of precedent427 concluding that the
pendency of a motion for rehearing does not toll the time for appealing from
a trial court's ruling on a motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a) for correction of an illegal sentence.428
Judge Farmer wrote a specially concurring opinion. He noted that he
concurred because he was bound to do so by stare decisis, but stated that if
he "were writing on a clean slate in this court," he did not think he would
join in a dismissal of the case.429 Judge Farmer pointed out that rule
3.800(a) is unique in that it allows a court "to correct an illegal sentence at
any time," and that its purpose is to provide any convicted person who "is
suffering under a sentence that is illegal" to have a "ready, expeditious and
effective tool at hand to test the illegality. 4 30 He then stated, "I do not
understand why the circuit court's denial of rehearing should not be treated
as itself an order denying relief from an illegal sentence, which is fully
appealable to us if the notice of appeal is filed, as here, within 30 days of
the court's order., 431
Judge Farmer went on to indicate that he did not believe that the court
"should shrink from considering whether a sentence may be illegal merely
because the prisoner made two attempts to persuade the trial judge, one of
them by motion for rehearing. '432 "The alternative," he said, "is for the
prisoner to continue serving a putatively illegal sentence while being barred
from having appellate review of the trial court's decision to deny such
relief. 433 Judge Farmer concluded his thoughts by stating, '"This alterna-
tive is so directly antagonistic to the plain meaning and purpose of rule
3.800(a) that I cannot believe this is what the drafters truly intended. 434
426. 643 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
427. See Campbell v. State, 637 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Jones v. State,
635 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Newman v. State, 610 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
428. Wright, 643 So. 2d at 1157.
429. Id. at 1157 (Farmer, J., concurring specially).
430. Id. at 1158 (footnote omitted).
431. Wright, 643 So. 2d at 1158 (Farmer, J., concurring specially) (footnote omitted).
432. Id.
433. Id. at 1158-59.
434. Id. at 1159 (footnote omitted).
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F. Special Assistant Public Defenders
Several cases addressed the issue of whether special assistant appellate
public defenders would be required to provide their clients with the records
and transcripts from their cases at the conclusion of their appeals.
In Pearce v. Sheffey,435 the Second District reaffirmed the conclusion
it reached in Thompson v. Unterberger,436 that "an indigent defendant is
entitled to possession of a transcript which was provided at public expense
to his court-appointed counsel, without being required to pay for photocopy-
ing the transcript."'43
7
The Third District, in Coates v. McWilliams,4 3 however, refused to
require a special assistant public defender to furnish his client with copies
of requested documents. The court pointed to the fact that no funds were
provided to reimburse the attorney for the cost of duplicating and forwarding
the copies to the client439 and the fact the attorney was required by an
administrative order to maintain the original documents for a period of three
years from the closing of the case.' The court stated, "[b]y accepting an
appointment as special assistant public defender, counsel does not become
obligated to bear the cost of furnishing documents to an indigent defendant,
even though a duly constituted public defender's office, which is properly
funded for such cost items, may be so required.""'
The Third District did require a special assistant public defender to
furnish his client with documents and transcripts in Beaubrum v. Rolle. 2
There, despite the court's request, the attorney failed to respond to the
client's petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought production of the
items. 3 The court noted the failure to respond and stated that "it appears
that there is no impediment in granting the relief sought."'
435. 647 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
436. 577 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
437. Pearce, 647 So. 2d at 333.
438. 650 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
439. Id. at 695.
440. Id. at 696.
441. Id.
442. 654 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
443. Id. at 560.
444. Id.
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G. Attorney's Fees and Costs in Criminal Cases
1. Attorney's Fees
In Zelman v. Metropolitan Dade County,4 5 the Third District ad-
dressed the issue of what hourly fee should be paid to an attorney for his
successful court-appointed representation of a defendant in a capital
appeal." 6  The court had previously quashed an initial award upon a
holding, in part, that the hourly rate was not limited to the $40 per hour for
out-of-court services and $50 per hour for in-court services established by
a trial court administrative order. 7  After a hearing for the purpose of
establishing a reasonable hourly rate, the trial court fixed the rate at the
same level, $40 per hour for out-of-court services and $50 per hour for in-
court services. 448 The Third District also quashed this order, remanding
for a new hearing to set a reasonable rate using the factors contained in Rule
of Professional Conduct 4-1.5. 449 That hearing resulted in an identical
award.450
On review of that order, the Third District concluded that based upon
the record and the court's own expertise, it was apparent that the award was
"not close to a reasonable fee for the difficult and uncommonly burdensome
services Zelman performed so well.,,451 The court went on to say: "In
view of the prior unfortunate history of this case, in which we seem to have
been so unsuccessful in making ourselves understood, we decline to require
still another hearing on the issue in the court below. '452 Rather, the court
determined that the attorney would be awarded $100 per hour for out-of-
court services and $125 per hour for in-court services rendered.453
445. 645 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
446. The appeal had resulted in the reversal of the defendant's two first-degree murder
convictions and the vacation of his two death sentences. Garcia v. State, 564 So. 2d 124
(Fla. 1990).
447. Zelman v. Metropolitan Dade County, 586 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991), appeal after remand, 622 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), appeal after remand,
645 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
448. Zelman, 645 So. 2d at 57.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 57-58.
451. Id. at 58.
452. Id.
453. Zelman, 645 So. 2d at 58.
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2. Costs
In a series of cases, the Fourth District found that it was improper to
include, either as a provision in a judgment of conviction, or as a condition
of probation, the prospective imposition of appellate costs. 4 As noted by
the court in Anderson v. State,55 such costs "may be taxed in favor of the
prevailing party, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a),
which 'explicitly provides for taxation of costs by the lower tribunal on
motions heard within 30 days after issuance of the mandate-but not be-
fore."' 456
H. Transcripts in Criminal Cases
In Brown v. State,457 following the procedure set forth in Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(2), the appellant's attorney served a
photocopy of the certified trial transcript on the office of the Attorney
General.5 8 The Attorney General's office refused to accept the uncertified
photocopy, explaining in a letter that it would not accept any transcript
unless it was prepared and certified by an official court reporter because
doing so would place upon that office the burden of checking the photocopy
pages against a certified copy filed with the appellate court.4 9 The
Attorney General relied upon Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(d),
which states that in criminal cases the clerk of the lower court shall provide
the trial transcript and the record on appeal to the Attorney General.4 °
The Fifth District found that rule 9.200(b)(2), which set forth the
procedure utilized by the appellant's counsel, "is applicable to criminal
appeals only to the extent that it does not conflict with rule 9.140(d)," 461
the rule relied upon by the Attorney General. Therefore, the court found
that the procedure employed by the appellant's counsel could not be used
454. See McDonald v. State, 649 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Davis v.
State, 641 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Anderson v. State, 632 So. 2d 132 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
455. 632 So. 2d at 132.
456. Id. at 133 (quoting Boyer v. Boyer, 588 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991), review denied, 599 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1992)).
457. 639 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
458. Id. at 634-35.
459. Id. at 635.
460. Id. In pertinent part, the rule states, "The clerk shall retain the original of the
record and shall forthwith transmit copies thereof to the court, to the attorney general, and
to the office of a public defender appointed to represent an indigent defendant." FLA. R. APP.
P. 9.140(d).
461. Brown, 639 So. 2d at 635.
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in criminal cases and held "that appellants in criminal cases must file a
certified copy of the trial transcript with the clerk of the lower court for
transmittal to the office of the Attorney General."462
I. Belated Appeals in Criminal Cases
1. Procedure for Obtaining Belated Appeals
In Stephenson v. State,463 the supreme court declined an invitation to
change the procedure it established in State v. District Court of Appeal, First
District" for obtaining a belated appeal. In District Court of Appeal, the
court had concluded that a claim for a belated appeal based on ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to file a timely notice of appeal must
be raised in the trial court in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850.465 In Stephenson, the court addressed the certi-
fied question of whether the district courts of appeal have the authority to
grant belated appeals when the record on appeal indisputably reflects that
trial counsel, through neglect, inadvertence or error, filed an untimely notice
of appeal and thus rendered ineffective assistance as a matter of law.4 s5
The question arose in a case in which the Second District dismissed an
appeal as untimely, but directed the trial court to grant a belated appeal if
one was sought by a legally sufficient motion.467 The court found it
"incongruous for us to dismiss Stephenson's direct appeal while at the same
time providing him with the remedy of a belated appeal, thereby delaying
a review of the merits of his case at the expense of judicial economy. 468
Nonetheless, the court recognized that it was not at liberty to cast aside the
process established by District Court of Appeal.469 The court indicated
that it would prefer to "dispense with the cumbersome procedure we have
fashioned, treat the notice of appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
and grant Stephenson belated review of the merits of his appeal."'47
462. Id.
463. 655 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1995).
464. 569 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1990).
465. Id. at 442.
466. 655 So. 2d at 86.
467. Stephenson v. State, 640 So. 2d 117, 118 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd, 655
So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1995).
468. Id.
469. Id. at 119.
470. Id.
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After discussing the proceedings in the lower courts and its decision in
District Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida, in approving the
Second District's decision, concluded that the district courts of appeal do not
have the authority to grant belated appeals resulting from ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.4" The court did give some indication that it
might be willing to revisit this question at some point in the future. The
court stated that "[flor now,"4' it was adhering to the principle established
in District Court of Appeal, and noted that the issue was "currently under
review by this Court and the Committee on Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure.24
73
The decision in Stephenson does not appear to have any effect on that
portion of District Court of Appeal which indicates that claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel should be raised by petition for writ of
habeas corpus filed in the appellate court.474
2. Due Process and Right to Counsel
In Moment v. State,475 the Fourth District, in one opinion, both
granted a belated appeal and reversed the order belatedly reviewed. The
case involved a situation in which, at a hearing on the defendant's motion
for post-conviction relief, filed about a month after sentencing, the trial court
ordered the defendant to pay $12,800 in restitution.476 The appellate court
found several problems with the proceedings at the trial level. The
defendant was not given notice of the hearing. 4' The defendant was not
represented by counsel at the hearing."7 No evidence was presented as
to restitution, the trial court relying instead on the prosecutor's statement
that she had received a phone call from the victim telling her the amount of
damages. 479 Finally, the defendant was not informed of his right to
appeal.480
The defendant did not appeal from the restitution order. Instead, he
moved to vacate restitution and appealed from the order denying that
471. Stephenson, 655 So. 2d at 87.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 87 n.1.
474. 569 So. 2d at 442 n.1.
475. 645 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
476. Id. at 503.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Moment, 645 So. 2d at 503.
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motion.481 The State argued that all of the defects could have and should
have been raised in a direct appeal from the order of restitution.4 2 The
court found that "because this case is so fundamentally and thoroughly
flawed in its most basic constitutional guarantees of due process and right
to counsel, we consider this an exceptional case and treat this as a petition
for a belated appeal of the restitution order, which we grant.
4 83
3. Belated Institution of a Belated Appeal
In Lofton v. State,484 the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
post-conviction relief that sought a belated appeal, and appointed a public
defender to pursue the appeal.485 Inexplicably, the appeal was not institut-
ed until twenty months after the entry of the trial court's order.486
Noting that under Mack v. State,487 a belated appeal must be instituted by
the filing of a notice of appeal within thirty days of rendition of the order
allowing the proceeding, the Fifth District dismissed the appeal.488 The
court concluded that the defendant would have to return to the trial court
with another motion for post-conviction relief, showing, if he could, that the
last delay was due to a legally cognizable excuse, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel, for failing to pursue the belated appeal.4 89
4. Other Cases
In Love v. State,4 ° the First District concluded that a defendant was
not precluded from obtaining a belated appeal by the fact that he had pled
guilty. 491
In Nava v. State,49 the Fourth District found that in the absence of
specific prejudice, the doctrine of laches does not bar a claim of entitlement
to a belated appeal.493
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. 639 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
485. Id. at 1134.
486. Id.
487. 586 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
488. Lofton, 639 So. 2d at 1134.
489. Id.
490. 638 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
491. Id. at 1063.
492. 652 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
493 Id. at 1265.
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In Keller v. State,494 the Fifth District granted a belated appeal to a
defendant who had already had an unsuccessful pro se appeal. The
defendant had requested counsel for his initial appeal and had been found
insolvent for purposes of appeal at that time.495 Despite that fact, no
appointment was made and the defendant consequently instituted his own
appeal and filed a brief, in which he again requested counsel. Categorizing
the defendant's efforts as "a futile attempt to muster an effective appeal,"
the court found that a belated appeal was appropriate.496
J. Review of Orders Waiving Juvenile Jurisdiction
In State v. Del Rey,497 the State appealed from, and sought certiorari
review of, a non-final order waiving juvenile jurisdiction over the respon-
dent and authorizing the State to prosecute the respondent as an adult.498
The challenged portion of the order: 1) reduced the three filed charges of
manslaughter by culpable negligence with a weapon to manslaughter by
culpable negligence, and 2) precluded the State from filing an information
charging the respondent as an adult with an offense other than the offenses
on which the court waived juvenile jurisdiction or any lesser included of-
fenses thereof.
499
The Third District dismissed the appeal, finding that "[t]here is no
Florida Supreme Court rule of procedure which authorizes the State to
appeal from a non-final order in a juvenile delinquency case, as here, and,
accordingly, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the State's ap-
peal.,,5°°
The court also dismissed the certiorari proceeding, finding that, under
the facts of the case, the State had failed to establish irreparable injury."'
The court noted that despite the existence of the challenged order, the State
had filed an information charging the respondent as an adult with three
counts of manslaughter by culpable negligence with a weapon and that the
respondent had moved to dismiss those counts.5 2 The court reasoned that,
if the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, the issue would become
494. 652 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
495. Id. at 1278.
496. Id.
497. 643 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
498. Id. at 1147.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 1148.
502. Del Rey, 643 So. 2d at 1148.
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moot, and that if the circuit court granted the motion, the State would have
the right to appeal from that order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A).503
K. Orders Reviewable in Criminal Cases
Numerous cases dealt with the question of whether certain orders were
reviewable and, if so, what type of proceeding was appropriate. These cases
included:
State v. Lewek.5 4 An order severing charges is neither appealable nor
an appropriate subject for certiorari." 5
State v. Riley.5° A sentence within the guidelines is not illegal even
if the trial court commits error by refusing to make habitual offender
findings on timely request by the State.5° Such a sentence therefore
cannot be appealed, 08 nor can the State obtain relief by mandamus or
certiorari." 9
Kolker v. State.5 10 "Certiorari is the appropriate means by which to
seek review of an order disqualifying a defendant's attorney. '51
State v. Fudge.512 The State may not appeal from a directed verdict
of acquittal as to a particular charge when the directed verdict is entered
after a jury deadlock on the charge." 3 Because of the deadlock, there is
no verdict, and section 924.07(1)(j) of the Florida Statutes, which allows the
State to appeal from a ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal
after a jury verdict, does not apply. 4
State v. Bradford.5  Certiorari is appropriate to review a trial court's
order excluding testimony as to the victim's state of mind before her murder
503. Id.
504. 656 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
505. Id. at 269.
506. 648 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
507. Id. at 826.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 826-27.
510. 649 So. 2d 250 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 658 So. 2d 991 (Fla.
1995).
511. Id. at 251 n.1.
512. 645 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
513. Id. at 24.
514. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 924.07(1)0) (1993).
515. 658 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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when the evidence is "crucial evidence" and thus, "there would be a
miscarriage of justice"5 6 if the 'evidence is not admissible.
XXIII. FAMILY LAW APPELLATE PRACTICE
A. Belated Appeals from Orders Terminating Parental Rights
In T.D. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,517 the First
District discussed the procedure to be used in obtaining belated appeals from
orders terminating parental rights."1 8 When the case first reached the
appellate court, it was dismissed because the notice of appeal was not timely
filed.5" 9 The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant's right to
file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court pursuant to the
procedure outlined by the supreme court in In the interest of E.H.120 In
E.H., the supreme court had concluded that when there is a claim that an
attorney's error precluded a parent from appealing an order terminating
parental rights, the parent, in a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial
court, may seek a belated appeal . 2'
Subsequent to the First District's dismissal in In the interest of T.D., a
petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the trial court. The petition,
however, was directed to the merits of the termination order containing a
brief explanation of the circumstances which occasioned the late filing of the
notice of appeal.5' The order denying the petition set forth no findings
relating to the question of whether a belated appeal was appropriate, but was
instead a reaffirmation of the merits of the order terminating parental
rights. 513
On appeal from that order, the First District pointed out that "the trial
court and respective counsel misconstrued the remedy authorized by the
supreme court in E.H."524 That remedy, the court stated, "is analogous to
that available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding to seek a belated
appeal predicated on ineffective assistance of counsel."5"
516. Id. at 574.
517. 639 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
518. Id. at 705.
519. In the interest of T.D., 623 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
520. Id. at 852-53. See In the interest of E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1992).
521. E.H., 609 So. 2d at 1290-91.
522. T.D., 639 So. 2d at 705.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id. n.1.
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Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the cause with directions
to the appellant to file a petition setting forth the grounds which demonstrate
the entitlement to a belated appeal. 26 The court further stated that the
"trial court's order should set forth such findings of fact as are necessary to
support the grant or denial of a belated appeal. 527
B. Premature Appeals
In State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Skin-
ner,528 the trial court entered three orders limiting the amount of retroac-
tive child support collectible in three proceedings in which the Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Services and the mothers sought a determination
of paternity and child support.529 The court determined that the orders
were non-final and not subject to review, and stated that in similar situa-
tions, it would normally dismiss the appeals.5 3' The court indicated,
however, that it had discovered that while the appeals were pending, final
orders had been entered in the cases and that the time for appealing from
those orders had expired.5 31 Noting that if it dismissed the appeals, the
department and the mothers would lose all chance for review, the court
treated the notices of appeal as premature appeals of the final orders,532
and considered the merits of the case.
C. Contempt for Failing to Pay Child Support
In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 the appellant was found in contempt of
court for failing to meet his child support obligations. He then failed to
either pay the purge amount established by the court or to surrender himself
to serve the alternative sentence imposed by the court. 34 On appeal from
the contempt order, the Third District pointed out that when an "appellant
has disobeyed an order of the trial court, the appellate court may, in its
discretion, either entertain or dismiss an appeal.5 35 The court noted that
although an appellate court should ordinarily provide a grace period prior
526. Id.
527. T.D., 639 So. 2d at 705.
528. 649 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
529. Id. at 281.
530. Id. at 282.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. 640 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
534. Id. at 134.
535. Id. (quoting Gazil v. Gazil, 343 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 1977)).
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to dismissing the appeal within which the appellant may comply with the
violated order and prevent dismissal, such a grace period is not necessary
when the appellant has absconded from the court's jurisdiction.536 Since
the appellant in Rodriguez had failed to surrender himself, the court applied
this principle and dismissed the appeal.537
XXIV. SANCTIONS
A. Parties
In Lowery v. Kaplan,538 the Fourth District dealt with a pro se
petitioner who was proceeding in forma pauperis.539 The petitioner had
filed twenty-eight petitions for extraordinary relief and twenty-one final and
non-final appeals within the preceding three years.5'4 None had met with
success.54' Noting that it has the "inherent authority to prevent abuse of
the judicial system,"'542 the court dismissed the pending petition as a
sanction for abusive filings543 and ordered the prospective denial of in
forma pauperis status for the petitioner's future petitions unless they are
presented by a member of The Florida Bar who represents the peti-
tioner.54
The Fourth District imposed similar sanctions in Martin v. Marko.545
There, as in Lowery,546 the court acted on its inherent authority.547 It
noted, however, that the Supreme Court of the United States had adopted a
specific rule authorizing the denial of a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis when the Court is satisfied that a case is "frivolous or mali-
cious." 548 The court went on to suggest that "[a]lthough Florida does not
presently have a similar rule, it would be prudent for our supreme court to
consider adopting a similar provision. 549
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. 650 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
539. Id. at 114.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id. at 115.
543. Lowery, 650 So. 2d at 116.
544. Id.
545. 651 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
546. 650 So. 2d at 114.
547. Martin, 651 So. 2d at 820.
548. Id. (quoting U.S. Sup. Cr. R. 39.8).
549. Id.
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In Isley v. State,5 ° the Fifth District indicated its frustration with a
petitioner who had come before the court nine times since 1990, when the
court affirmed his conviction and sentence for second degree murder. Judge
Sharp's opinion begins with the following statement: "This case reminds
me of my grandmother's final warning and admonition to me and my
siblings as children, when we had exhausted her patience with our doings.
'Enough is enough,' she would say. And that was the end of it."
551
The opinion goes on to prohibit the petitioner from filing any further
pro se pleadings with the court concerning the conviction and sentence in
question, and concludes by echoing the words of Judge Sharp's grand-
mother: "Enough is enough. 552
In Scott v. State,53 a case described by the Fifth District as "another
successive and repetitive proceeding," the court stopped short of imposing
the sanction it imposed in Isley, but warned that the appellant was
"approaching an abuse of process and an exhaustion of this court's
patience. 554
Likewise, in Skinner v. State,555 a per curiam affirmance without
opinion, Judge Sharp wrote a specially concurring opinion to state her belief
that while the petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner lacked
substantive merit, the primary reason why it should be denied was that it
constituted "an abuse of process." 5 6 She noted that the petitioner's claims
could have been raised in a previous petition he had filed, and that the
petitioner had made no showing that the second set of claims were not
known or could not have been discovered when the first petition was
filed.557 Writing in the hope to "forestall such petitions Skinner may
contemplate filing in the future," she stated that the failure to make such a
showing made the second petition, "and any future ones similarly drafted,
an abuse of process. 558
550. 652 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
551. Id. at 410.
552. Id. at 441.
553. 656 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
554. Id. at 204.
555. 656 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
556. Id. at 282.
557. Id.
558. Id.
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B. Attorneys
In Keene v. Nudera,"9 a petition requesting certiorari review was
filed with the Second District, and neither a filing fee nor an order of
indigency accompanied the petition.5" The court gave the petitioner's
counsel an opportunity to prove his client's indigency status, but counsel
failed to either obtain an order from the trial court or to file a sufficient
motion and affidavit with the district court.5 The court noted that on at
least ten occasions in the preceding twenty-five months, the attorney had
filed appellate proceedings in the Second District without a fee or an order
of indigency.562 The court stated that it was apparent from the attorney's
presentation at the hearing on the order to show cause that the attorney was
not willfully disobeying the court's orders, but that he did not understand
the basic procedures for establishing indigency status in an appellate
proceeding.563 Accordingly, the court concluded that a fine would not be
the most productive solution to the problem.564 Instead, the court ordered
the attorney to obtain, within twelve months, a minimum of ten hours of
continuing legal education in appellate practice or procedure, in addition to
the continuing legal education required of attorneys by rule 6-10.3 of the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.5 65
In Beaubrum v. Rolle," the Third District directed an attorney, who
had acted as a special assistant public defender, to deliver to the petitioner
all documents and transcripts in his possession that related to the circuit
court and appellate proceedings in the case. 67 When he failed to do so,
the court appointed a commissioner to take testimony and to make findings
and recommendations as to whether the attorney should be disciplined by
way of determination that he was in contempt of court.56' The commis-
sioner concluded that the attorney had been negligent, but noted that some
mitigating factors existed. 69 He recommended that the attorney be found
in contempt of the Third District, that he be fined an amount to be
559. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1232 (2d Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1995).
560. Id. at D1232.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Id. at D1232-33.
564. Keene, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D1233.
565. Id. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 6-10.3.
566. 654 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
567. Id. at 560.
568. In re Rolle, 654 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
569. Id. at 560.
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determined by the court and that he be required to pay a court reporter fee
of $113.570 Based upon this recommendation, the court ordered the
attorney to show cause why he should not be fined $500 and required to pay
the $113 court reporter fee.57' When the attorney failed to respond to the
order, the court found him in contempt and imposed the above-noted
sanctions.572
In State v. Davis,573 the court "reluctantly" granted a motion to
reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed because the appellant's counsel
did not timely file a brief or move for an extension of time.5 74 The court
accepted counsel's grounds for reinstatement, which were not set forth in the
opinion, but stated that it was writing the opinion "as a reminder that such
noncompliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure will not be tolerat-
ed. 575 The court "further caution[ed] that orderly and timely appellate
practice can also be assured by fines, costs, reprimand and contempt against
an attorney. 576
Similar language was used in Hastings v. State,577 when the Second
District quashed a circuit court order dismissing an appeal from a county
court judgment due to the untimely filing of the appellant's initial brief.578
In opposing the petition for writ of certiorari filed in the district court, the
circuit judge argued that tardiness in prosecuting appeals is a continuing
problem in his court and that denying him the right to dismiss the appeal
would be "emasculating the appellate rules and destroying the efficiency of
his court 'for there is no other sanction that the Circuit Court can impose
upon negligent appellate counsel that is as effective. ' '5 79
The district court, while expressing its appreciation for the exasperation
of the judge, disagreed, concluding that "fines, costs, reprimand, and
contempt against the attorney will insure an orderly and timely appellate
practice in circuit court."5
80
570. Id. at 560-61.
571. Id. at 561.
572. In re Beaubrum, 654 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
573. 19 Fla. L. Weekly D2399 (4th Dist Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1994).
574. Id. at D2399.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. 640 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
578. Id. at 116.
579. Id. at 117.
580. Id. (emphasis added).
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XXV. STAYS
Receding from its prior precedent, the Fourth District, in Florida
Eastern Development Co. v. Len-Hal Realty,5"' found that Title 11 of the
United States Code, section 362(a)(1), which provides for an automatic stay
of all legal proceedings "against" a debtor who has filed a suggestion of
bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, is applicable to
appellants in the district court in cases in which the original trial proceed-
ings were "against them."582
The court had previously held, in Marine Charter & Storage v.
Underwriters,5 3 that the provision did not apply to debtors who were
appellants because appeals are proceedings brought by, not against,
appellants.584 The court in Florida Eastern, however, was swayed by the
fact that all federal courts that have considered the issue have found that the
stay applies whenever the original proceedings were against the debtor,
regardless of whether the debtor was an appellant or appellee on appeal.58
The court therefore receded from Marine Charter,86 and acknowledged
the applicability of the stay to appellants when the trial level proceedings
were against them.587
XXVI. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
A. Attorney's Fees
1. Timeliness of Award of Appellate Attorney's Fees
In Judges of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. Janovitz,88 the supreme
court held that "when a motion for appellate attorney's fees has been timely
filed, the court may enter an award of attorney's fees within a reasonable
time after the issuance of the mandate." '89 The court further noted that
there is no requirement that the award be made in the same term of court so
long as it is entered within a reasonable time." ° The court thus upheld an
581. 636 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc).
582. Id. at 757. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994).
583. 568 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
584. Id. at 946.
585. 636 So. 2d at 757.
586. Id. at 758.
587. Id. at 757.
588. 635 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1994).
589. Id. at 20.
590. Id.
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award of appellate attorney's fees that was entered by a circuit court acting
in its appellate capacity fifty-four days after it had issued its mandate.591
The court disapproved of the Third District's decision in Dyer v. City of Mi-
ami Employee's Retirement Board,592 which had concluded that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order on attorney's fees after its
mandate had issued.593
2. Application of a Multiplier to Appellate Attorney's Fees
In Stack v. Lewis, 59 4 the trial court applied a multiplier in awarding
attorney's fees due to "'the substantial uncertainty of prevailing, the
substantial uncertainty of collecting and because the result obtained was the
maximum possible result."'5 95 On review, the appellant argued that the
multiplier should not apply to the fees earned from the appeal.596 The
appellant reasoned that the appeal process began a new case and that the
appellee's likelihood of success on appeal was high since he won in the trial
court. 597 The First District disagreed, noting that the moment for deter-
mining the likelihood of success is "'at the outset' or "'at the time the case
was initiated,' ' 598 and that the appellee employed the same attorneys from
the beginning of the litigation through appeal.599 In light of these factors,
and the fact that both the trial and appellate work were governed by a
contingency arrangement, the court concluded that there was "no reason to
treat the appellate hours differently from the trial hours."
60°
3. Appellate Attorney's Fees Pursuant to Section 768.79 of the
Florida Statutes
In Mark C. Arnold Construction Co. v. National Lumber Brokers,
Inc.,6"' the trial court awarded fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79(1)
of the Florida Statutes, because the judgment was "'at least 25 percent
591. Id.
592. 512 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
593. Janovitz, 635 So. 2d at 20.
594. 641 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
595. Id. at 970.
596. Id.
597. Id.
598. Id. (citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1151
(Fla. 1985)).
599. Stack, 641 So. 2d at 970.
600. Id.
601. 642 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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greater than"' the pretrial demand for judgment.' After affirming the
judgment per curiam without opinion,"°3 the First District aligned itself
with the Fourth' and Fifth' 5 Districts in granting, on the same grounds
as the trial court, the appellee's motion for an award of reasonable costs and
attorney's fees incurred in successfully defending the judgment on ap-
peal.6°6
4. Appellate Attorney's Fees in Eminent Domain Matters
In Department of Transportation v. Gefen,' 7 the supreme court held
that a landowner claiming inverse condemnation is only entitled to appellate
attorney's fees if the claim is ultimately successfl. 608  Thus, the court
found that a landowner who prevailed in the district court was not entitled
to attorney's fees when the supreme court quashed the district court
decision.09
5. Review of Orders Determining the Right to Attorney's Fees
but Not Setting the Amount
Each of the district courts of appeal have recently ruled that orders
determining the right to attorney's fees, which do not set the amount of such
fees, are not appealable.
610
B. Costs
In Lee County v. Eaton,61 the trial court entered an order requiring
Lee County, a nonparty to a civil action between two individuals, to pay the
cost of a transcript used on appeal by a successful appellant. 612 The trial
602. Id. at 576.
603. Id.
604. Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1043 n.10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
605. Williams v. Brochu, 578 So. 2d 491, 495 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1991).
606. Mark C. Arnold Construction, 642 So. 2d at 576.
607. 636 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1994).
608. Id. at 1347.
609. Id.
610. See Wometco Enters. v. Cordoves, 650 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Trans Atlantic Distribs., L.P. v. Whiland & Co., S.A., 646 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994); Mcllveen v. Mcllveen, 644 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gonzalez Eng'g,
Inc. v. Miami Pump & Supply Co., Inc., 641 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
611. 642 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
612. Id. at 1126.
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court concluded that because the appellant was indigent, she was entitled to
certain court services without charge under section 57.081 (1) of the Florida
Statutes (1993).613
The Second District reversed the order, stating: "Although an indigent
person is entitled to receive some services of the court system without
charge, this statutory right has never been interpreted to require a county to
pay for a transcript in a typical civil action filed by an indigent person in
that county's circuit court.' 614 The court also stated that although section
57.081(1) specifies that an indigent person is entitled to free services from
"'the courts, sheriffs, and clerks, ' 615 no reference is made in the statute
"'to county-subsidized services from the official court reporter, nor is there
any reference to free transcripts in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.430. ' ' ,616 Further, the court continued: "There is no constitutional right
to a free transcript in such an appeal. 617
XXVII. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
In the upcoming year, the Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee,
pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.130, will submit its
four-year cycle report to the supreme court, recommending changes to the
appellate rules. The court will likely ask for comments on the committee's
report in the spring of 1996 and adopt such changes as it deems appropriate
that fall. Also in the upcoming year, the First District is expected to set up
an appellate mediation program. Such programs have the potential to have
significant impact on the appellate process. Of course, the courts this
coming year will provide answers to many of the questions raised by the
cases discussed in this article. The answers, as they usually do, will likely
generate new questions. Those questions, and others, will continue to
produce the large number of court decisions that shape the field of appellate
practice.
613. Id.
614. Id. at 1126-27.
615. Id. at 1127.
616. Eaton, 642 So. 2d at 1127.
617. Id.
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